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THE NORTH AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM
ON THE JUDICIARY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Who's Afraid of the Precautionary Principle?
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL*
Although the precautionary principle is a relatively recent
concept in the history of environmental law, it has been widely
embraced throughout the world. As articulated in the Rio Decla-
ration, signed in 1992 by representatives of 178 nations, the prin-
ciple provides that a lack of scientific certainty should not
preclude states from adopting cost-effective measures to control
environmental risks.' The European Union (EU) has expressly
endorsed the precautionary principle as part of its regulatory di-
rectives, 2 and some argue that the principle is so widely accepted
that it should be recognized as customary international law.3
* Robert F. Stanton Professor of Law and Director, Environmental Law Pro-
gram, University of Maryland School of Law. Professor Percival expresses his appre-
ciation to Khushi Desai and April Birnbaum for their research assistance. He also
would like to thank Dr. John D. Graham, Administrator of the Office of Management
and Budget's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, and other participants in
the Georgetown Environmental Research Workshop, for their valuable comments on
a previous draft of this article.
1. "Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scien-
tific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation." U.N. Conference on Environment & Develop-
ment (UNCED), June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
Principle 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Principle 15],
quoted in ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw, SCIENCE &
POLICY 1039 (4th ed. 2003).
2. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMMUNICATION FROM THE
COMMISSION ON THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2000) [hereinafter COMMUNICATION],
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health-consumer/library/pub/pub07_en.
pdf.
3. See generally James Cameron, The Status of the Precautionary Principle in
International Law, in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 262 (Tim
O'Riordan & James Cameron eds., 1994).
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Despite its growing popularity, the precautionary principle
has come under fire in recent years. Its detractors generally have
been drawn from the ranks of those who are well known critics of
environmental regulation. 4 They argue that the precautionary
principle is incoherent, potentially paralyzing, and that it will
lead regulators to make bad choices. 5 Implicit (and sometimes ex-
plicit) in their argument is the notion that society faces greater
peril from overly costly regulations adopted at the behest of a fear-
ful public than from exposure to sources of environmental risks
whose effect on human health and the environment is not fully
understood at present.
This paper argues that, for the most part, critics of the pre-
cautionary principle are attacking a straw man. It maintains that
they are confusing the precautionary principle with the separate
question of how precautionary regulatory policy should be, both in
the breadth of regulatory targets and the stringency with which
they are regulated. While precaution has long been an important
aspiration of much of United States environmental law, in prac-
tice, regulatory policy generally has been reactive, rather than
truly precautionary. Only in rare circumstances-the most prom-
inent example being the Montreal Protocol on Substances that De-
plete the Ozone Layer 6-have activities that generate
environmental risks been subjected to strict regulatory action
when the risks they generate were entirely theoretical. Although
such truly precautionary regulation is rare, the essential notion
embodied in the precautionary principle-that uncertainty should
not be used as an excuse to eschew cost-effective preventive mea-
sures-is fundamental to modem environmental law's quest to
transcend the limits of its common law legacy. The precautionary
principle does not require that innovation come to a halt whenever
any risks may be conjured. Properly understood, the precaution-
ary principle is neither incoherent, paralyzing, nor a prescription
for overregulation. Rather, it cautions that regulatory policy
should be pro-active in ferreting out potentially serious threats to
human health and the environment, as confirmed by the history of
human exposure to substances such as lead and asbestos.
4. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
5. Id.
6. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-5, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://hq.unep.org/ozone/
pdfs/Montreal-Protocol2000.pdf.
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The paper begins by examining the history of the precaution-
ary principle and the criticisms levied against it by its critics. It
then examines the role that precaution has played in the history
of U.S. environmental law, focusing on the history of human expo-
sure to lead and asbestos. The paper then concludes by assessing
the precautionary principle in light of this experience. It con-
cludes that even though the precautionary principle is not in itself
a decision rule, it should still be considered an important element
of modern environmental law.
I. HISTORY OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
Some have argued that the precautionary principle is
thousands of years old because millennial oral traditions of indige-
nous people contain the concept of precaution. 7 Others trace it to
a doctor's recommendation in 1854 to remove the handle of a
water pump to stop a cholera epidemic," or to the 1874 amend-
ment of the British Alkali Act that imposed technology-based lim-
its on emissions of noxious gases by certain factories. 9
Although many examples exist of precautionary measures be-
ing undertaken prior to the twentieth century, 10 what has come to
be known as the precautionary principle emerged only late in that
century. The roots of the precautionary principle usually are
traced to the concept of Vorsorgeprinzip, developed in Germany
during consideration of legislation in the 1970s to prevent air pol-
lution from damaging forests." One translation of Vor-
sorgeprinzip into English is "foresight planning," though that
phrase does not adequately capture its true meaning. 12 Vorsorge
is "a word that combines notions of foresight and taking care with
7. Philippe H. Martin, "If You Don't Know How to Fix It, Please Stop Breaking
It!": The Precautionary Principle and Climate Change, 2 FOUND. OF ScI. 263, 276
(1997).
8. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE 20TH CENTURY: LATE LESSONS FROM
EARLY WARNINGS 5 (Poul Harremoes et al. eds., 2002).
9. Nigel Haigh, The Introduction of the Precautionary Principle into the UK, in
INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 3, at 229, 241.
10. See, e.g., id. at 241; Harremoes et al., supra note 8, at 5.
11. Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, The Precautionary Principle in Ger-
many-Enabling Government, in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra
note 3, at 31, 36.
12. Timothy O'Riordan & James Cameron, The History and Contemporary Signif-
icance of the Precautionary Principle, in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCI-
PLE, supra note 3, at 12, 16.
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those of good husbandry and best practice."' 3 It does not demand
elimination of risk, regardless of its likelihood or the costs entailed
in doing so. 14 Rather, Vorsorge encourages the incremental reduc-
tion of known adverse environmental impacts, without requiring
scientific certainty of the links between specific pollutants and
specific diseases. 15
In 1984 the German Federal Interior Ministry explained the
meaning of Vorsorge in the following terms:
The principle of precaution commands that the damages done to
the natural world (which surrounds us all) should be avoided in
advance and in accordance with opportunity and possibility.
Vorsorge further means the early detection of dangers to health
and environment by comprehensive, synchronised (harmonised)
research, in particular about cause and effect relationships ....
it also means acting when conclusively ascertained understand-
ing by science is not yet available. Precaution means to develop,
in all sectors of the economy, technological processes that signif-
icantly reduce environmental burdens, especially those brought
about by the introduction of harmful substances. 16
The notion that environmental harm should be foreseen before it
occurs was not new, nor was the realization that scientific uncer-
tainty should not be an obstacle to taking sensible preventive
measures. These concepts were reflected in many of the early en-
vironmental statutes adopted in various countries during the late
1960s and 1970s, including the Swedish Environmental Protec-
tion Act of 1969.17 But during the 1980s these concepts came to be
articulated more specifically as the precautionary principle, or
precautionary approach,' which first was endorsed in a series of
international agreements to protect the North Sea. 19
13. NOGA MORAG-LEVINE, CHASING THE WIND: REGULATING AIR POLLUTION IN THE
COMMON LAW STATE 11 (2003).
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. REPORT FROM THE GOVERNMENT TO THE FEDERAL PARLIAMENT ON THE PROTEC-
TION OF AIR QUALITY (Germany 1984) (citation omitted), quoted and translated in
Boehmer-Christiansen, supra note 11, at 37.
17. Environmental Protection Act of 1969 (Svensk fdrfattningssamling [SFS]
1969:387, reprinted in 1989:363) (Swed.).
18. The terms "precautionary principle" and "precautionary approach" have been
used almost interchangeably, though the former seems to be preferred by those who
are more enthusiastic about the concept. See NICOLAS DR SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL
PRINCIPLES: FROM POLITICAL SLOGANS TO LEGAL RULES 92 (2002).
19. See International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, Bremen Min-
isterial Declaration (1984) ("Conscious that damage to the marine environment can be
[Vol. 23
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The most significant international endorsement of the precau-
tionary principle occurred at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de
Janeiro. The Rio Declaration, signed by the 178 nations partici-
pating in the conference, including the United States, stated in
Principle 15: "In order to protect the environment, the precaution-
ary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a rea-
son for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmen-
tal degradation."20 While the English translation of Principle 15
refers to "the precautionary approach," the official translation in
several other languages refers to "the precautionary principle."21
The Rio Declaration's statement of the precautionary princi-
ple has been widely embraced in subsequent international agree-
ments. Virtually identical language was incorporated into the
1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change22 and the Pre-
amble to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 23 which were
adopted at the Rio Earth Summit. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992
adopted the precautionary principle without explaining what it
irreversible or remediable only at considerable expense and over long periods and
that, therefore, coastal states and the EEC must not wait for proof of harmful effects
before taking action ...."); Second International Conference on the Protection of the
North Sea, London Ministerial Declaration (1987) ("In order to protect the North Sea
from possibly damaging effects of the most dangerous substances, a precautionary
approach is necessary which may require action to control inputs of such substances
even before a causal link has been established by absolutely clear scientific evi-
dence."), quoted in DE SADELEER, supra note 18, at 94 nn.4-5.
20. Principle 15, supra note 1.
21. Per Sandin, Better Safe than Sorry: Applying Philosophical Methods to the
Debate on Risk and the Precautionary Principle, THESES IN PHILOSOPHY FROM THE
ROYAL INST. OF TECH. 5 (2004) ("rsiktighetsprincipen," or "precautionary principle"),
available at http://www.infra.kth.se/-sandin/dissintro.pdf.
22. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change commits its
parties "to take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes
of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects." U.N. Conference on Environment
& Development, June 3-14, 1992, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCC), Article 3(3), Principle 15, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (1992), quoted in
DE SADELEER, supra note 18, at 97. It declares:
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full sci-
entific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such mea-
sures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal with climate
change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the low-
est possible cost.
Id.
23. 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) ("where there is a threat of
significant reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty
should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a
threat"), quoted in DE SADELEER, supra note 18, at 97.
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provides, 24 as did the 1997 Treaty establishing the European
Community (EC), which declared that EC environmental policy
"shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the princi-
ples that preventive action should be taken, that environmental
damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the
polluter should pay."25 As discussed below, in February 2000 the
European Commission issued a Communication on the precau-
tionary principle to explain in considerable detail its views con-
cerning what the principle is and how it should be applied in EC
environmental policy decisions. 26
The United States government has been reluctant to embrace
the precautionary principle, even though it is generally consistent
with the thrust of most U.S. environmental laws, as discussed in
Part III below. Disagreements over application of the principle
have arisen in the context of trade disputes between the United
States and the EU, regarding the importation of genetically modi-
fied food products. 27 In May 2003, the United States, with the
support of Canada, requested World Trade Organization (WTO)
consultations with the EC, charging that the "moratorium applied
by the EC since October 1998 on the approval of biotech products
has restricted imports of agricultural and food products from the
US and Canada."28 The United States and Canada argued that it
was unlawful discrimination for "a number of EC member States
[to] maintain national marketing and import bans on biotech
products even though those products have already been approved
by the EC for import and marketing in the EC."29
24. See The Maastricht Treaty, art. 130r, Feb. 7, 1992, available at http://www.
eurotreaties.com/maastrichttec.pdf.
25. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts-Consolidated
Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Union, art. 174(2), Oct. 2, 1997 O.J.
(C 340).
26. See COMMUNICATION, supra note 2.
27. See World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS291, European
Communities: Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products
(July 1, 2005), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/cases-e/ds291_e.htm.
28. Id.
29. See id. In the "beef hormones dispute," the WTO had previously recognized
that its Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) pro-
vides that "when sufficient scientific evidence does not exist to permit a final decision
on the safety of a product or process," members may take provisional precautionary
measures. World Trade Organization, SPS Agreement Training Module: Chapter 8:
Current Issues: The "Precautionary Principle," http://www.wto.org/englishtratop-e/
sps.e/sps-agreement cbt e/c8s2ple.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2005); World Trade Or-
ganization, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: Introduction: Understanding the
WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (May 1998) [hereinafter
[Vol. 23
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II. CRITICISMS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE
As the precautionary principle has grown in popularity, it has
come under fire from critics who believe that it could exacerbate
what they perceive as a trend toward overregulation. Frank Cross
argues that "the precautionary principle is deeply perverse in its
implications for the environment and human welfare."30 Com-
plaining that the growing popularity of the precautionary princi-
ple threatens risk analysis, Gail Charnley criticizes the principle
as anti-science and accuses its proponents of waging "the newest
skirmish in the age-old battle between empirical science and anti-
empirical ideology."31 Aaron Wildavsky derides the precautionary
principle as "a marvelous piece of rhetoric";32 and Bjorn Lomborg
maintains that if it is used to strengthen environmental protec-
tions, "the precautionary principle is actually all about making
worse decisions than we need to."33 More recently, Robert Hahn
and Cass Sunstein have argued that "taken seriously, the precau-
tionary principle can be paralyzing, providing no direction at
all,"3 4 in contrast to cost-benefit analysis, which they favor as a
decision rule. Sunstein devotes much of his book, Laws of Fear:
Beyond the Precautionary Principle, to attacking the principle as
Understanding the WTO Agreement], http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/sps-e/sps
unde.htm. It had also emphasized that the SPS Agreement expressly recognizes
"the sovereign right of any government to provide the level of health protection it
deems appropriate," excluding misuse. Id. Under the leadership of Director General
Pascal Lamy, the WTO has placed renewed emphasis on the importance of incorporat-
ing environmental concerns into trade liberalization policy. Lamy recently has ar-
gued that, "Contrary to the perception of some members of the public, [trade] can be a
friend, and not a foe, of conservation." Pascal Lamy, WTO Dir. Gen., Speech at the
WTO Symposium on Trade and Sustainable Development within the Framework of
Paragraph 51 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration (Oct. 10-11, 2005), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/sppll07-e.htm.
30. Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 851, 851-52 (1996).
31. President's Message, RISK NEWSLETTER (Soc'y for Risk Analysis, McLean,
Va.), Third Quarter 1999, at 2.
32. AARON WILDAVSKY, BUT IS IT TRUE? A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL
HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES 428 (1995).
33. BJoRN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL
STATE OF THE WORLD 350 (Hugh Matthews partial trans., Cambridge Univ. Press
2001).
34. Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, The Precautionary Principle as a Basis
for Decision Making, THE ECONOMISTS' VOICE, 2005, Issue 2, Art. 8, at 1, 7.
2005-20061
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indefensible, though he ultimately concludes that it can be useful
in some circumstances. 35
While arguing that the precautionary principle is dangerous,
its critics also charge that it is so vague as to be incoherent. John
Graham notes that the U.S. government considers the notion of
"any universal precautionary principle... to be a mythical con-
cept, perhaps like a unicorn."36 In a recent lecture Cass Sunstein
declared that "the precautionary principle is incoherent."37
Although there is no single, universally accepted formulation
of the precautionary principle, the most widely embraced state-
ment of it is that contained in the Rio Declaration, which was en-
dorsed by nearly every country in the world.38 Principle 15 of the
Rio Declaration states that "[wihere there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation."39 Notice that this statement does
not specify how precautionary regulatory policy should be. Rather
it states only that if there are threats of significant harm, scien-
tific uncertainty should not serve as an obstacle to taking cost-
effective preventive measures. It does not specify how significant
the harm must be, nor what particular cost-effective preventive
measures should be undertaken. Thus, it should not be viewed as
an effort to establish any particular, prescriptive decision rule.
Critics of the precautionary principle concede that the formu-
lation articulated in the Rio Declaration is unobjectionable. 40 Re-
ferring to this as a "weak version" of the precautionary principle,
Sunstein describes it as "important" and "necessary in practice
only to combat public confusion or the self-interested claims of pri-
35. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
(2005).
36. John Graham, Administrator, Office of Info. & Reg. Affairs, Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, The Role of Precaution in Risk Assessment and Management: An American's
View, Remarks at the Conference on the U.S., Europe, Precaution and Risk Manage-
ment: A Comparative Case Study Analysis of the Management of Risk in a Complex
World (Jan. 11-12, 2005), available at http://www.useu.be/RiskManagement/Janll02
GrahamUSRiskManagementPrecPrin.htm.
37. Cass Sunstein, Lecture, Irreversible and Catastrophic: Global Warming, Ter-
rorism, and Other Problems, 23 PACE ENvTL. L. REV. 3, 4 (2005-2006).
38. See UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Division for Sustainable
Development, Documents (Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/
agenda21/.
39. Principle 15, supra note 1. The words "cost-effective" in Principle 15 were
added at the insistence of the U.S. delegation to the Rio Earth Summit.
40. See, e.g., LOMBORG, supra note 33, at 348-49; Cross, supra note 30, at 920.
[Vol. 23
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vate groups demanding unambiguous evidence of harm, which no
rational society requires."41
Rather than concentrating their fire on the Rio Declaration,
critics of the precautionary principle focus on what they describe
as a "strong version" that would require stringent regulation of
anything that cannot be shown not to pose a possible risk to
health, safety, or the environment. 42 For example, Frank Cross
argues:
Applied fully and logically, the precautionary principle would
cannibalize itself and potentially obliterate all environmental
regulation. Environmentalists would apply the principle to
chemicals and industries, but why not apply it to the environ-
mental regulations themselves? According to the burden of
proof approach, advocates of regulation would be required to
demonstrate to a certainty the absence of counterproductive ef-
fects on health resulting from the effects of the regulation itself.
The practical consequences of regulation are so uncertain that
advocates typically could not meet this burden, and the precau-
tionary principle would preclude further regulation. 43
Such an extreme version of the precautionary principle seems
farfetched, but its critics, at times, seem intent on creating a cari-
cature of it in an effort to defuse its growing popularity.44 Their
41. SUNSTEIN, supra note 35, at 18, 23-24.
42. Critics of the precautionary principle frequently attempt to tie it to the "Wing-
spread Statement on the Precautionary Principle," drafted by a group of academics
attending a conference in January 1998. See Global Development Research Center,
Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle, available at http://www.gdrc.
org/u-gov/precaution-3.html; SUNSTEIN, supra note 35, at 19. The Wingspread State-
ment includes the sentence: "When an activity raises threats of harm to human
health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some
cause and effect relationships are not established scientifically." Wingspread Decla-
ration, quoted in SUNSTEIN, supra note 35, at 19. They use the Wingspread Statement
as a straw man to imply that proponents of the precautionary principle seek to pro-
hibit any activity that has the potential to cause harm. However, such an extreme
interpretation has neither been embraced by the larger environmental community,
nor adopted by regulatory policymakers.
43. Cross, supra note 30, at 861.
44. As John Applegate notes,
[t]he precautionary principle is frequently caricatured as requiring the
regulator to ban or forgo an activity or technology altogether, and some-
times it has been used to justify such action (for example, bans on geneti-
cally modified organisms ('GMO's)). However, none of the texts speaks in
such absolute terms. The precautionary principle embraces a range of
regulatory responses, taking into account a variety of factors (severity,
cost, risk trade-offs) and a flexible degree of risk aversion.
9
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primary objection is founded on the notion that precautionary reg-
ulation may create risks of its own, either by depriving society of
"opportunity benefits" that could prevent even greater harm than
that prevented by the regulation, or by inducing substitution of
products or activities that pose even greater risks than those
caused by the subject of regulation. 45 This objection is similar to
the now-familiar "risk-risk" tradeoff argument made by critics of
environmental regulation. 46 In the context of regulating well-
known risks, the argument is highly problematic when it urges
that such risks not be regulated because of the possibility that
other, less well-understood risks may take their place and be even
more significant.4 7 Since history teaches that the most common
way society becomes aware of risk is from the actual manifesta-
tion of harm, 4s it is dubious to assume that substitute activities or
products necessarily will be more risky. Given the substantial
barriers agencies face when engaging in risk regulation, theoreti-
cal risks that are taken seriously enough to generate precaution-
ary regulation are unlikely to be systematically less harmful than
unknown and unregulated risks.
Moreover, it has been shown that risk-tradeoff analysis is bi-
ased against environmental regulation because it focuses only on
ancillary risks generated by regulation, and not on regulation's
ancillary benefits. 49 Rascoff and Revesz note that many environ-
mental regulations produce substantial ancillary benefits:
For example, a more stringent standard for carbon monoxide
emissions in automobile exhaust not only achieved its target of
reducing air pollution, but also had the ancillary benefit of sig-
nificantly reducing loss of life attributable to carbon monoxide-
related accidents and suicides. Policies targeting greenhouse
gas reductions can be expected to have the ancillary benefit of
reducing conventional air pollutants. Policies favoring waste-
water management through constructed wetlands have ancil-
John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 13, 19-20 (2002) (internal citations omitted).
45. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 35, at 26-32.
46. See generally RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995).
47. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword in RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECT-
ING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 46, at vii-xi.
48. This phenomenon is referred to as "the dilemma of preventive regulation" in
PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 343-45.
49. See Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk TradeoffAnal-
ysis: Towards Parity in Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1763, 1763 (2002).
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lary benefits for public use and preservation of habitats.
Medical interventions-most notably drug therapies-have
been observed to have significant ancillary benefits. 50
It is curious that some critics of the precautionary principle
cite the difficulty of remediating existing environmental contami-
nation as a reason for eschewing the precautionary principle. For
example, Frank Cross cites as examples of risk-risk tradeoffs the
fact that efforts to remediate asbestos and lead contamination oc-
casionally make things worse by inadvertently releasing more of
these toxic substances into the environment. 51 One would think
that the great difficulty of remediating these contaminants actu-
ally would present an even stronger justification for enhanced pre-
cautionary measures to prevent their initial placement into the
environment.
Drawing from the growing literature on the psychology of risk
perception, Cass Sunstein maintains that there is reason to be-
lieve that the public will be overly fearful of certain immediate
risks that are statistically far less dangerous than what would
substitute for them if regulators responded to public demands for
precaution. 52 David Dana has presented a strong counterargu-
ment that the precautionary principle is justified as a mechanism
to counteract the same cognitive biases on which Sunstein re-
lies.53 Dana maintains that the public will be more inclined to
avoid the immediate costs of compliance with precautionary regu-
lations whose uncertain benefits will accrue only in the future.54
Sunstein concedes that this criticism "is not implausible" and that
the precautionary principle can "undoubtedly lead[ I to some good
results"; 55 but he maintains that the same myopia that supports
Dana's argument also would apply to the public's perceptions of
the countervailing risks that would be incurred by the taking of
precautionary action.56 Thus, Sunstein's argument appears to
rest largely on the notion that precautionary action is more likely
to be counterproductive than beneficial because the public is inca-
pable of knowing what statistically is in its best interests. He con-
50. Id. at 1766 (citations omitted).
51. See Cross, supra note 30, at 898-99.
52. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 35, at 36-49.
53. See David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Prin-
ciple, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1315, 1320-1330 (2003).
54. See id. at 1324, 1334-38.
55. SUNSTEIN, supra note 35, at 52-53.
56. See id. at 52-55.
2005-2006]
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cludes that cost-benefit analysis offers one way out of this self-
constructed conundrum,5 7 without analyzing how efforts to quan-
tify the costs and benefits of regulation may distort decision-mak-
ers' perceptions of the levels of uncertainty associated with them.
Yet Sunstein ultimately concedes that for risks for which there
are no satisfactory bases for balancing costs and benefits, such as
catastrophic risks or the risks of species extinction, something
akin to the precautionary principle makes good sense. 58
Recently, Gary Marchant and Kenneth Mossman have
sharply criticized the precautionary principle by characterizing it
as a vehicle for justifying arbitrary and discriminatory trade mea-
sures imposed by members of the EU.5 9 Based on an analysis of
decisions by EU courts, Marchant and Mossman argue that the
precautionary principle has been applied in an arbitrary and in-
consistent manner. 60 They conclude that this "confirms the fears
of many skeptics of the precautionary principle that it provides an
open invitation for arbitrary and unreasonable decisions by both
regulators and judges."6 1 Ironically, this criticism of the precau-
tionary principle-that it can be manipulated to promote arbi-
trary decision-making-echoes a major criticism of cost-benefit
analysis that garnered substantial support because of the asym-
metrical way in which it was employed by the Reagan Administra-
tion in a misguided effort to relax regulatory constraints on
industry. 62
Proponents of cost-benefit analysis who argue that acceptance
of the precautionary principle is likely to lead to bad choices by
regulatory authorities essentially are asserting that regulatory
policy will be overly precautionary, generating social costs that ex-
ceed the benefits of regulation. Yet, as noted above, the precau-
tionary principle does not purport to tell us how precautionary to
be. Per Sandin has identified the four major elements of the pre-
cautionary principle: "(1) the threat dimension, (2) the uncertainty
dimension, (3) the action dimension, and (4) the command dimen-
57. See id. at 63, 129-48, 225.
58. See Sunstein, supra note 37, at 16.
59. GARY E. MARcHANT & KENNETH L. MossMAN, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS: THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION COURTS 1-3 (2004).
60. Id. at 1-3, 64-65.
61. Id. at 65.
62. See Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of
the Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 184-89 (1991).
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sion."63 The "threat dimension" refers to the potential dangers of
the activity, product, or substance that would trigger precaution-
ary action. 64 The "uncertainty dimension" refers to the limits of
knowledge concerning whether the regulatory target poses the
hazard.65 The "action dimension" concerns how regulatory au-
thorities will respond to the threat, while the "command dimen-
sion" refers to their degree of discretion in doing so.66 Sandin
describes the four questions that must be answered to make the
principle operative:
1. To what types of hazards does the principle apply?
2. Which level of evidence (lower than that of full scientific
certainty) should be required?
3. What types of measures against potential hazards does the
principle refer to?
4. With what force are these measures recommended
(mandatory, merely permitted, etc.)? 67
Applying these concepts to the Rio Declaration's statement of
the precautionary principle-"Where there are threats of serious
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation"-(1) the principle would apply to
hazards "of serious or irreversible damage"; (2) where there is
something short of full scientific certainty; (3) the actions that
could be taken are cost-effective prevention measures; and (4) the
command is not to use lack of scientific certainty as a reason to
postpone taking such action.
In a very limited sense, this statement of the precautionary
principle may tell us something about how precautionary to be by
at least establishing that certain hazards should not be ignored
entirely. As Sandin notes, the statement actually is directed only
at deeming a particular argument ("lack of full scientific cer-
tainty") unacceptable as a reason for postponing undefined cost-
effective actions to prevent the harm.68 One should not postpone
63. Per Sandin, Dimensions of the Precautionary Principle, 5 HuM. & ECOLOGICAL
RISK ASSESSMENT 889, 889 (1999).
64. See id. at 891-92.
65. See id. at 892-94.
66. See id. at 894-95.
67. Per Sandin et al., Five Charges Against the Precautionary Principle, 5 J. RISK
RESEARCH 287, 290 (2002).
68. See id. at 289. Sandin calls this an "argumentative" version of the precaution-
ary principle to distinguish it from "prescriptive" versions that provide more content
concerning how precautionary regulatory policy should be in the face of uncertainty.
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taking cost-effective measures to prevent serious or irreversible
damage, though it is not clear how great the threat must appear to
be in order to trigger application of the principle.
It certainly is appropriate for the precautionary principle not
to attempt to dictate how precautionary regulatory policy should
be. Decisions concerning how much protection to afford to public
health and the environment are so fundamental to the relation-
ship between governments and their citizenry that the products of
democratic political processes must inform them. The environ-
mental laws that these countries adopt are the authoritative dec-
larations of how precautionary regulatory policy should be.
As debate continues over how precautionary regulatory policy
should be, efforts are being made to develop more refined methods
for incorporating the precautionary principle into decision-making
processes in many of these countries. 69 For example, the Commis-
sion of the European Communities has issued a Communication
outlining a detailed approach to using the precautionary principle
and establishing guidelines for applying it.70 As John Applegate
notes, this Communication seeks "to fit the precautionary princi-
ple into the risk paradigm," rather than serve as an alternative to
it.71 The Communication undermines the notion that European
regulators have adopted an "absolutist" version of the precaution-
ary principle that requires stringent regulation of anything al-
leged to pose a threat. The Communication states in relevant part
that:
Recourse to the precautionary principle presupposes that poten-
tially dangerous effects deriving from a phenomenon, product or
process have been identified, and that scientific evaluation does
not allow the risk to be determined with sufficient certainty.
The implementation of an approach based on the precau-
tionary principle should start with a scientific evaluation, as
complete as possible, and where possible, identifying at each
stage the degree of scientific uncertainty.
[I Decision-makers need to be aware of the degree of uncer-
tainty attached to the results of the evaluation of the available scien-
tific information. Judging what is an 'acceptable' level of risk for
See id. at 289-90. As an example of a prescriptive version of the principle, Sandin
cites the Wingspread Statement. Id. at 289.
69. See, for example, the mechanisms outlined in ADRIAN DEVILLE & RONNIE HAR-
DING, APPLYING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (1997).
70. See COMMUNICATION, supra note 2.
71. Applegate, supra note 44, at 61.
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society is an eminently political responsibility. Decision-makers
faced with an unacceptable risk, scientific uncertainty and public
concerns have a duty to find answers. Therefore, all these factors
have to be taken into consideration.
In some cases, the right answer may be not to act or at least not
to introduce a binding legal measure. A wide range of initiatives is
available in the case of action, going from a legally binding measure
to a research project or a recommendation.
The decision-making procedure should be transparent and
should involve as early as possible and to the extent reasonably pos-
sible all interested parties.
[] Where action is deemed necessary, measures based on the
precautionary principle should be, inter alia:
" proportional to the chosen level of protection,
* non-discriminatory in their application,
" consistent with similar measures already taken,
" based on an examination of the potential benefits and costs of
action or lack of action (including, where appropriate and fea-
sible, an economic cost/benefit analysis),
* subject to review, in the light of new scientific data, and
" capable of assigning responsibility for producing the scientific
evidence necessary for a more comprehensive risk
assessment.
72
The Communication emphasizes flexibility in responding to
suspected risks. It permits both risk assessment and examination
of costs and benefits, while recognizing the importance of review-
ing interim regulatory measures in light of new scientific evi-
dence. While it does not rule out banning products if that is the
only possible way to control a risk, the Communication does en-
dorse measures to require prior approval of potentially dangerous
products and in certain cases shifts the burden of proof to the pro-
ducer, manufacturer, or importer.7 3
72. COMMUNICATION, supra note 2, at 4.
73. Australia also has adopted its own refinements to the precautionary principle
that are anything but absolutist. In May 1992, representatives of all levels of govern-
ment in Australia signed the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment. It
defines the precautionary principle as follows:
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage,
lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postpon-
ing measures to prevent environmental degradation. In the application of
the precautionary principle, public and private decisions should be guided
by:
(i) careful evaluation to avoid, wherever practicable, serious or irre-
versible damage to the environment; and,
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A comparison of risk regulation in Europe and the United
States concluded that the EU is not systematically more precau-
tionary in its regulatory policy than is the United States.74 The
United States has been more precautionary than the EU in re-
sponding to certain risks, including mad cow disease in blood, die-
sel engine exhaust, particulate air pollution, tobacco consumption,
and terrorism.75 Although this has been deemed a surprise be-
cause the precautionary principle has been much more influential
in Europe than in the United States, it should not be that surpris-
ing in light of the fact that the principle does not dictate how pre-
cautionary regulatory policy should be. Yet most critics of the
precautionary principle base their objections to it on the notion
that it will inexorably produce bad policy choices weighted too
heavily in the direction of preventing environmental harm.76 It
also should not be surprising when one considers that, even with-
out expressly embracing the precautionary principle, U.S. envi-
ronmental law has developed in a manner quite consistent with
many elements of it, as discussed in the section that follows.
III. THE HISTORY OF PRECAUTION IN U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A review of the history of U.S. environmental law can shed
light on why Congress took a decidedly precautionary turn during
the 1970s when it adopted comprehensive regulatory legislation to
protect human health from environmental risks. Even before the
precautionary principle took center stage in the 1990s, some of its
harshest critics already were arguing that U.S. environmental
policy had become unduly precautionary in response to public
overreaction to environmental risks.77 Yet, despite the regulatory
statutes' commitment to preventative regulation, chemicals are
(ii) an assessment of the risk-weighted consequences of various
options.
DEVILLE & HARDING, supra note 69, at 13.
74. Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the Compari-
son and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L. L. 207, 261-
62 (2003).
75. Id. at 225-29.
76. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY
ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982); Peter Huber,
Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985); PHANTOM RISK: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE AND THE LAW (Ken-
neth R. Foster et al. eds., 1993); Philip H. Abelson, Toxic Terror: Phantom Risks, 261
ScI. 407 (July 23, 1993) (book review).
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still rarely regulated until after they have been released into the
environment and damage to public health has become apparent. 78
This "dilemma of preventative regulation" reflects that it is al-
ways easier for scientists to identify hazards and to predict harm
after it occurs, and that regulation is most politically salient when
it responds to hazards that have become highly visible to the pub-
lic. As a result, rather than realizing its promise of preventative
regulation, environmental policy often is saddled with the far
more difficult task of remediating environmental contamination
after it has occurred.
Critics of the precautionary principle fear that if regulatory
policy responds to what they view as excessive public fear of cer-
tain risks, the precautionary principle will lead to bad choices. 79
Yet the factors that influence how regulatory policy responds to
environmental risks are not well understood. In particular, few
retrospective studies have explored why society has in many in-
stances failed to prevent pervasive environmental contamination
from substances, such as lead and asbestos, that long were known
to be extremely hazardous. Even as scientific knowledge concern-
ing the hazards of lead accumulated over time, the legal system
failed to avert widespread lead poisoning. The regulatory history
of lead stands in sharp contrast to the response to the strato-
spheric ozone depletion problem, a rare instance in which truly
precautionary regulation was undertaken solely in response to a
seemingly compelling scientific theory before actual harm to pub-
lic health had been detected.8 0
A. Lead Poisoning in Early America
Lead can serve some very useful functions, but, like asbestos
and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), it ultimately has proven to be ex-
tremely hazardous to human health and the environment. While
78. The principal exceptions are new therapeutic drugs and pesticides, which can-
not legally be marketed until after they have been approved by the Food and Drug
Administration or EPA following extensive and specified testing. See PERCIVAL ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 334-35; Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 653
n.61 (1980). As the precautionary principle has grown in popularity, greater efforts
now are being made to conduct testing of high-production volume chemicals in the
United States, and to mandate pre-market testing protocols in the European Union
through the Registration, Evaluation, and Authorisation of Chemicals (REACH) pro-
gram. Europa, REACH, http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/chemicals/reach.htm
(last visited Dec. 16, 2005).
79. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
80. See SETH CAGIN & PHILIP DRAY, BETWEEN EARTH AND SKY: How CFCs
CHANGED OUR WORLD AND ENDANGERED THE OzoNE LAYER 189-207 (1993).
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its chemical properties make it easy to use in a variety of prod-
ucts, lead performs no useful function in the human body.8 1 Expo-
sures from anthropogenic sources have caused lead to increase in
the bodies of humans as a result of the use of lead in products,
paint, plumbing, emissions from gasoline combustion and smelt-
ers, and lead in waste streams.8 2 Levels of lead found in core sam-
ples in Greenland's icecap suggest that by the year 1750 lead-
smelting activity had increased atmospheric deposition of lead to a
level (0.0100 mg/kg) twenty times greater than the background
level present in 800 B.C. (0.0005 mg/kg).8 3 The Industrial Revolu-
tion and a massive increase in combustion of leaded gasoline have
increased lead levels in icecap strata today to a level (0.21 mg/kg)
more than 400 times natural background levels.8 4
As one of the most thoroughly studied toxic substances, lead
has been found to cause a broad array of adverse health effects in
humans. Exposure to high levels of lead can cause death.8  At
lower levels of exposure, lead can cause anemia, kidney damage,
neurological injury, and reproductive and developmental dysfunc-
tion.86 Lead also interferes with blood biochemistry and is associ-
ated with high blood pressure.8 7 At a certain level of exposure to
lead, "virtually all body systems will be injured or have a high risk
of injury."88 But lead is also particularly dangerous because of the
apparently irreversible neurological and reproductive damage
that it can cause; even at relatively low levels of exposure that are
not uncommon even today.8 9 Because many of the health effects
81. See COMMITTEE ON LEAD IN THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, LEAD IN THE HUMAN
ENVIRONMENT 3-5 (1980) [hereinafter LEAD IN THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT]; Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Lead Toxicity Physiologic Effects, http://www.
atsdr.dcd.govfHEC/CSEM/lead/physiologic-effects.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2005).
82. See generally LEAD IN THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, supra note 81; Jerome 0.
Nriagu, A History of Global Metal Pollution, 272 Sci. 223 (1996).
83. Thomas D. Matte et al., Occupational Lead Exposure, in HUMAN LEAD EXPo-
SURE 155, 156 (Herbert L. Needleman ed., 1992).
84. Id. at 156.
85. EPA, Technology Transfer Network Air Toxics Website, Lead Compounds
[hereinafter Lead Compounds], http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/hlthef/lead.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 17, 2005).
86. Id.
87. Id. Because lead is the oldest and most extensively studied neurotoxin, infor-
mation about the adverse health effects associated with human exposure to lead is
voluminous. One of the most useful summaries of this information is contained in
Chapter IV of AGENCY FOR Toxic SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, THE NATURE
AND EXTENT OF LEAD POISONING IN CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS IV-1 (1988).
88. Id. at IV-3.
89. See Lead Compounds, supra note 85.
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caused by exposure to lead do not have easily identifiable symp-
toms, lead poisoning is often difficult to diagnose,90 particularly
for physicians who have little knowledge or experience with the
disease.
The use of high concentrations of lead in pewter is believed to
have been responsible for considerable lead poisoning in colonial
America.91 Perhaps the most remarkable early legislative re-
sponse to lead poisoning occurred in the Massachusetts Bay Col-
ony in 1723. The colonial legislators enacted a law prohibiting the
distillation of rum through leaden still heads or leaded pipes fol-
lowing complaints that colonists in North Carolina had become ill
from drinking rum distilled in New England.92 While the legisla-
tion probably reflects greater concern for preserving profitable
trade than for protecting public health, it indicates that colonial
authorities understood some of the potential hazards of lead.
Benjamin Franklin was the most important public figure to
publicize the dangers of exposure to lead in colonial America.
While working in England as a printer's apprentice in 1724,
Franklin observed the maladies suffered by workers exposed to
the heating of lead type during the cleaning process.93 In 1745 he
published Thomas Cadwalader's "Dry Gripes," an essay arguing
that epidemics of "dry gripe," which most people associated with
the drinking of rum, actually were caused by the use of lead
materials in distillation equipment. 94 While in Paris in 1767,
Franklin visited a hospital that had become famous for treating
"what [he] call[ed] Dry Bellyach, or Colica Pictonum."95 After ob-
taining a list of the occupations of the patients, Franklin noted
that,
90. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
LEAD BASED PAINT IN YOUR HOME: SAFETY ALERT, CPSC DOCUMENT #5054, available
at http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/pubs/5054.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
91. Carey P. McCord, Lead and Lead Poisoning in Early America: Benjamin
Franklin and Lead Poisoning, 22 INDUS. MED. & SURGERY 393, 395, 396, 399 (1953).
92. An Act for Preventing Abuses in Distilling of Rum and Other Strong Liquors,
with Leaden Heads or Pipes (enacted Sept. 3, 1723), reprinted in id. at 397. The Act
declared that "the strong liquors and spirits that are distill(e)d through leaden heads
or pipes are judged on good grounds to be unwholesome and hurtful." Id. It specified
a fine of one hundred pounds for each violation and directed municipalities to appoint
inspectors to enforce the prohibition. Id. Penalties collected under the Act were to be
divided "one-half to the poor of the town where the offence is committed, and the other
half to him or them that shall inform and sue for the same." Id.
93. McCord, supra note 91, at 394.
94. Id. at 393-94.
95. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Benjamin Vaughan (July 31, 1786), re-
printed in id., at 398.
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all the Patients were of Trades, that, some way or other, use or
work in Lead, such as Plumbers, Glaziers, Painters, &c., except-
ing only two kinds, Stonecutters and Soldiers. These I could not
reconcile to my Notion, that Lead was the cause of that Disor-
der. But on my mentioning this Difficulty to a Physician of that
Hospital, he inform'd me that the Stonecutters are continually
using melted Lead to fix the Ends of Iron Balustrades in Stones;
and that the Soldiers had been employ'd by Painters, as
Labourers, in Grinding of Colours.96
These and other observations convinced Franklin of the hazards of
lead. In a letter to a friend in 1786, Franklin described the
sources of lead poisoning and questioned "how long a useful Truth
may be known and exist, before it is generally receiv'd and prac-
tis'd on."97
Early in the nineteenth century, Congress responded to a se-
ries of spectacular boiler explosions on steamships by regulating
the construction and maintenance of steamship boilers, 98 but
health and safety regulation was otherwise left entirely to the
states. In the late nineteenth century, state and local govern-
ments began to assume greater responsibility for protecting
worker health and safety. Beginning with Massachusetts in 1877,
twenty-three states enacted factory inspection laws. 99 In 1907, Il-
linois created a Commission on Occupational Diseases whose re-
port helped enact an Occupational Diseases Act in 1911.100 This
legislation required employers to "'adopt and provide reasonable
and approved devices, means or methods for the prevention of
such industrial or occupational diseases as are incident to such
work or process."' 10 1 However, the preventative provisions in the
law were largely unenforced until the 1930s when the Illinois Su-
preme Court struck them down as "an unwarranted and void dele-
gation of legislative power."102
96. Id.
97. Id. at 399.
98. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN L. REV.
1189, 1196 (1986). Congress initially adopted legislation regulating steamship boilers
in 1838 and then strengthened the law in 1852. Id.
99. DYING FOR WORK: WORKERS' SAFETY AND HEALTH IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 65 (David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz eds., 1987).
100. CLAUDIA CLARK, RADIUM GIRLS: WOMEN AND INDUSTRIAL HEALTH REFORM,
1910-1935 187-88 (1997).
101. Id. at 188 (quoting the Occupational Disease Act of 1911).
102. See Vallat v. Radium Dial Co., 196 N.E. 485, 487-88 (Ill. 1935) (citation
omitted).
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In 1906, Congress responded to public concern about the
safety of the food supply by enacting federal meat inspection legis-
lation 10 3 and the Pure Food and Drugs Act.104 This legislation
was animated more by concern over the economic impact of public
fears than by concern for protecting public health. Rather than
authorizing broad new regulations to protect health, the Pure
Food and Drugs Act primarily prohibited fraudulent representa-
tions concerning food and drug products.105 Similar concerns pro-
vided the rationale for enactment of the Federal Insecticide Act of
1910, which was designed to protect growers from being misled by
false claims concerning the nature and efficacy of pesticide
products.106
During the early twentieth century, two important develop-
ments occurred in the understanding of lead toxicity. Scientists
discovered that children were highly sensitive to lead exposure10 7
and that environmental, in addition to occupational, sources of
lead could be significant.'08 Lockhart Gibson had established a
link between use of lead-based paint and childhood lead poisoning
in Australia in 1892.109 In turn-of-the-century Hungary, children
in the homes of "home industry" potters suffered from the symp-
toms of lead poisoning because the working and living conditions
were appallingly contaminated. 10 These were important scien-
tific developments for understanding the nature and scope of the
hazards posed by lead. But they had little effect on regulatory pol-
icy toward lead until long after World War II.
B. Controversy over the Introduction of Tetraethyl
Lead (TEL)
By the early 1920s, lead poisoning was well recognized as a
major public health problem. A German publication in 1922 listed
103. Act of June 30, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-382, 34 Stat. 669, 674 (1906) (authorizing
meat inspection).
104. Pure Food and Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
105. Rabin, supra note 98, at 1228.
106. See Christopher Schroeder, The Evolution of Federal Regulation of Toxic Sub-
stances, in GOVERNMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON HISTORICAL DE-
VELOPMENTS SINCE WORLD WAR Two 263, 281 (Michael J. Lacey ed., 1989).
107. SIR THOMAS OLIVER, LEAD POISONING: FROM THE INDUSTRIAL, MEDICAL, AND
SOCIAL POINTS OF VIEW 177-84 (1914).
108. Id. at 161.
109. Reaching Teachers to Teach Technology, Knowledge about the Health Effects
of Lead (July 5, 2005), http://www.rst2.edu/ties/lead/university/resources/experts/
book-appendixlinfo/timelines.htm.
110. OLIVER, supra note 107, at 76-82.
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more than 3000 works about lead, including lead poisoning and
lead-related regulations.'11 A medical monograph, published in
the United States in 1926, described lead poisoning as "a prevent-
able disease" that "is not only the most common poisoning in in-
dustry," but also the product of "diverse non-industrial sources"
such as water supplies, drugs, and cosmetics. 11 2
Despite widespread awareness of the hazards of lead, the use
of lead in American industry increased dramatically in the early
twentieth century. Ultimately, this resulted in the release of un-
precedented quantities of lead directly into the environment,11 3
generating some of the first expressions of concern over the public
health implications of lead exposure outside the occupational con-
text. Even before the development of gasoline lead additives, the
growth of the automobile industry and its use of lead acid batter-
ies had increased industrial use of lead. The discovery of tetra-
ethyl lead (TEL) ensured that every street and highway in the
nation would be dusted with substantial lead deposits. 114
To facilitate the manufacture of cars with larger engines,
General Motors (GM) sought to develop a new fuel additive that
would enhance gasoline combustion and avoid engine knock.11 5
After testing thousands of chemical compounds during years of
trial and error experimentation, GM researcher Thomas Midgley,
Jr. discovered in December 1921 that TEL had the properties GM
desired. 116 GM joined with Standard Oil of New Jersey (Standard
Oil) to form the Ethyl Corporation (Ethyl) to market the new lead
additive.1' 7 The product initially was shipped directly to gas sta-
tions by DuPont, Ethyl's contractor, in small bottles that could be
added to each tank of gasoline.' 1 8
On December 20, 1922, Hugh Cumming, the U.S. Surgeon
General, sent a letter to Pierre du Pont that reflected an aware-
111. ELSE BLANSDORF, BLEILITERATUR: SCHRIFTEN AUS DEM GESAMTGEBIET DER
GEWERBEHYGIENE (1922).
112. JOSEPH C. AUB ET AL., LEAD POISONING ix (1926).
113. Nriagu, supra note 82, at 223.
114. David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz, A 'Gift of God'?: The Public Health Con-
troversy over Leaded Gasoline during the 1920s, 75 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 344, 349
(1985).
115. See CAGIN & DRAY, supra note 80, at 27, 32-33.
116. Id. at 33-34. In addition to Cagin & Dray's book, the other comprehensive
description of the history of the controversy over introduction of tetraethyl lead into
gasoline is Rosner & Markowitz's article, supra note 114.
117. CAGIN & DRAY, supra note 80, at 35.
118. Id.
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ness of the severity of the lead poisoning problem. 119 It stated:
"'Since lead poisoning in human beings is of the cumulative type
resulting frequently from the daily intake of minute quantities, it
seems pertinent to inquire whether there might not be a decided
health hazard associated with the extensive use of lead tetra ethyl
in engines.'"120 Du Pont referred the letter to Midgley. Although
Midgley had become severely lead poisoned as a result of his own
research, he was convinced that the effects of his illness were re-
versible and that TEL posed no danger to the public because it
would be sold in diluted form.121 He claimed that virtually all the
lead would remain in the car's engine. Midgley wrote the Surgeon
General that while people working in tunnels might absorb "'a
very small"' amount of lead, "'the average congested street will
probably be so free from lead that it will be impossible to detect
it.' "122
TEL went on sale in Dayton, Ohio in February 1923. To as-
suage public fears about TEL, GM and Ethyl funded a study of its
safety by the U.S. Bureau of Mines in October 1923.123 In October
1924, before the study was completed, news reached the public
that four workers in a TEL manufacturing plant near Elizabeth,
New Jersey had died from lead poisoning after suffering violent
delusions. 124 Several dozen other workers had also been hospital-
ized.' 25 Dubbed "loony gas" in the popular press, TEL subse-
quently was found to be responsible for the deaths of four other
workers in a DuPont plant, two deaths in a GM facility, and many
other hospitalizations. 126 With memories of chemical warfare in
World War I still fresh in many minds, a public outcry ensued and
several cities banned the sale of TEL.' 27
In March 1925, the Bureau of Mines released its study of the
health effects of TEL.' 28 The study was based on research expos-
ing rabbits, dogs, guinea pigs, monkeys, and pigeons to exhaust
from autos burning leaded gasoline for several hours on 188 differ-
119. Id. at 36.
120. Id. (quoting Letter from Hugh Cumming to Pierre Du Pont (Dec. 20, 1922)).
121. See id. at 35-36.
122. Id. at 36-37 (quoting Letter from Thomas Midgely to Hugh Cumming).
123. Id. at 37.
124. See id. at 46-47.
125. See id. at 47.
126. See id. at 49-50.
127. There were at least thirteen deaths from exposure to TEL in the various
plants. See Willard F. Machle, Tetra-Ethyl Lead Intoxication and Poisoning by Re-
lated Compounds of Lead, 105 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 578, 578 (1935).
128. CAGIN & DRAY, supra note 80, at 50.
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ent occasions. 129 It found no health risks from exposure to the ex-
haust fumes. 130 Public health officials criticized the study
because the Bureau of Mines had little expertise on health issues
and because GM and Standard Oil funded the study.' 3 ' At the
urging of Harvard professor of public health Alice Hamilton and
others, the Surgeon General convened a conference in May 1925 to
consider the health risks of TEL.132 Seventy representatives of la-
bor, industry, and the public health community participated in the
conference, which ultimately resolved that the Surgeon General
appoint a group of experts to complete a study of the health
hazards of TEL by January 1, 1926.133 The manufacturers of such
additives agreed not to sell them until the panel convened by the
Surgeon General completed its studies.1'4
In response to this resolution, the U.S. Public Health Service
(PHS) examined 252 men, some of whom worked at gas stations
where leaded gasoline was sold and others who did not. 135 In Jan-
uary 1926, the PHS released its study, which detected no differ-
ence in the health of the different groups of subjects. 136 It found
that TEL posed no health risks to the general public, but rather
that it was dangerous only when used in concentrated form during
manufacturing and processing. 137 It proposed that workers in
TEL plants could be protected by installing ventilation devices to
prevent worker exposure to fumes. 138 Dangers to gas station at-
tendants were deemed slight, and dangers to the general public
were thought to be virtually nonexistent. 139 To control the risk of
using leaded gasoline for cleansing or other purposes, it was
agreed that ethyl gasoline should be dyed and clearly labeled as
such. 140 The study provided little basis for evaluating the long-
term health effects of emissions from leaded gasoline; and Alice
Hamilton and other members of the public health community,
129. ENVIRONMENTAL CoNTAMINANTs ENCYCLOPEDIA: LEAD ENTRY 70 (Roy J. Irwin
ed., 1997), available at http://www.nature.nps.gov/hazardssafety/toxic/lead.pdf.
130. CAGIN & DRAY, supra note 80, at 50.
131. See id. at 50-51; Rosner & Markowitz, supra note 114, at 346.
132. CAGIN & DRAY, supra note 80, at 50-52.
133. Id. at 51-54.
134. See id. at 54.
135. See id.; Rosner & Markowitz, supra note 114, at 350.
136. See id.
137. See CAGIN & DRAY, supra note 80, at 54-55.
138. Public Health Service, The Use of Tetraethyl Lead Gasoline in Its Relation to
Public Health, 163 PUB. HEALTH BULL. 118 (1926).
139. See Rosner & Markowitz, supra note 114, at 350-51.
140. See Public Health Service, supra note 138, at 118-19.
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who wanted industry to develop a safe substitute for TEL, criti-
cized it.141 However, the conference procedure that had been used
by the Surgeon General was widely applauded, and it was em-
ployed again in December 1928 to consider the problem of radium
poisoning in workers painting luminous dials on watch faces and
other instruments. 142 The Radium Conference produced results
similar to the Tetraethyl Lead Conference-it was agreed that the
problem would be studied further-but it provided a vehicle for
publicizing the concerns of workers.' 43
Alice Hamilton, who had conducted the pioneering Illinois in-
vestigation of occupational diseases, ultimately expressed satis-
faction with the use of the conference procedure. In 1929 she
stated that she doubted "if any method of dealing with a new
poison in industry would work more promptly and efficiently than
does this entirely informal and extra-legal method that we Ameri-
cans have devised, given a new and striking danger which lends
itself to newspaper publicity."1 44 However, she noted, "it cannot
be used to combat old and familiar dangers, lead, silica dust, mer-
cury, benzol. Nor can it be used for the newer poisons which do
not produce spectacular effects; and these are much more numer-
ous."1 45 Hamilton thought the Tetraethyl Lead Conference had at
least helped protect workers in TEL manufacturing plants from
suffering from very severe lead poisoning. In her autobiography,
published in 1943, she noted that "close watch is still kept to de-
tect possible cases, but the precautions worked out ... seem thus
far to be so adequate that we do not fear any serious injury to the
people employed" in occupations using tetraethyl lead.' 46
141. See CAGIN & DRAY, supra note 80, at 54-55.
142. See generally CLARK, supra note 100, at 151-57.
143. See id. at 154.
144. Alice Hamilton, Nineteen Years in the Poisonous Trades, HARPER'S, Oct. 1929,
at 580, 587.
145. Id. at 587.
146. ALICE HAMILTON, EXPLORING THE DANGEROUS TRADES: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
ALICE HAMILTON, M.D. 416-17 (1943). Hamilton's positive attitude has puzzled his-
torians in light of the fact that the conference disregarded her plea that a substitute
for tetraethyl lead be developed to protect public health. William Graebner states
that her attitude's "overly sanguine character might be explained as the product of
the nearly two-decade lapse between the event and its recollection," and by Hamil-
ton's "ardent belief in cooperation and persuasion as problem-solving devices." See
William Graebner, Private Power, Private Knowledge, and Public Health: Science, En-
gineering, and Lead Poisoning, 1900-1970, in THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF WORKERS:
CASE STUDIES IN THE POLITICS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 15, 38 (Ronald Bayer
ed., 1988).
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The Surgeon General actually had recognized that the PHS
study was inadequate for assessing the long-term effect of lead ad-
ditives on human health. His "blue-ribbon" committee's report, is-
sued in 1926, warned that,
it remains possible that if the use of leaded gasoline becomes
widespread conditions may arise very different from those stud-
ied by us which would render its use more of a hazard than
would appear to be the case from this investigation. Longer ex-
perience may show that even such slight storage of lead as was
observed in these studies may lead eventually in susceptible in-
dividuals to recognizable or to chronic degenerative diseases of a
less obvious character. In view of such possibilities the commit-
tee feels that the investigation begun under their direction must
not be allowed to lapse .... It should be possible to follow
closely the outcome of a more extended use of this fuel and to
determine whether or not it may constitute a menace to the
health of the general public after prolonged use or other condi-
tions not now foreseen .... The vast increase in the number of
automobiles throughout the country makes the study of all such
questions a matter of real importance from the standpoint of
public health .... 147
However, in the decades to follow, the lead industry continued
to control virtually all research, and the close monitoring recom-
mended by the Surgeon General's committee was not under-
taken. 148  The United States refused to sign the 1921
International Labour Organization agreement restricting the use
of lead-based paint and, having acquiesced to the introduction of
lead alkyls in gasoline, both government and industry appeared in
alignment to promote expanded uses of lead. 149 Indeed, it was not
until the 1970s that national regulatory attention focused on the
chronic effects of exposure to lead on children's health.150
In the years prior to this shift, the lead industry worked hard
to convey the impression that extensive scientific investigation
had resolved all concerns about the health effects of lead emis-
147. DYING FOR WORK, supra note 99, at 134-35.
148. See id. at 134.
149. See International Labour Organization, List of Ratifications of International
Labour Conventions, White Lead (Painting) Convention, 1921 (No.13), http://web
fusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/appl/appl-byconv.cfm?conv=CO13&1; see
also generally infra note 150.
150. See Gerald Markowitz & David Rosner, "Cater to the Children": The Role of
the Lead Industry in a Public Health Tragedy, 1900-1955, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEA.LTH 36,
44 (2000).
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sions from gasoline combustion. Promoting the notion that most
human lead exposure was part of a natural process, Dr. Robert
Kehoe, medical director for Ethyl, argued that the human body
excreted as much lead as it absorbed. 151 Thus, according to the
industry, there was little cause for concern about the rapidly in-
creasing use of lead in industrial products. There was, however,
evidence that levels of lead in street dust had increased by almost
50 percent in the first decade after the introduction of TEL in gas-
oline. 152 Reports of widespread lead poisoning in children contin-
ued to mount during the 1950s. Julian Chisholm reported that
some Baltimore children were excreting six times more lead than
workers exposed to lead in occupational settings. 153 Physicians in
Philadelphia reported that forty-one children had died from lead
poisoning between 1956 and 1960 and that "control ha[d] not been
accomplished."154
In 1958, the lead industry announced that it wanted to in-
crease by one-third the concentration of lead additives in gasoline
in order to accommodate cars with larger engines. 55 Without
making any effort to evaluate the extent to which prior use of TEL
had contributed to air emissions of lead, an advisory committee
formed by the PHS decided that this would not pose a hazard to
public health. 56 Efforts to monitor levels of lead in ambient air
were launched in the early 1960s. In 1961, the PHS commenced a
study that sampled levels of lead in the air of Cincinnati, Los An-
geles, and Philadelphia. This "Three-City Study" provided data
that permitted researchers to begin to link airborne lead with lead
levels in human blood. 157 Governmental and research groups
later conducted a "Seven-City Study" in cooperation with repre-
151. Air Pollution-1966, Hearings on S.3112 and S.3400 before a Subcomm. on
Air and Water Pollution of the Comm. on Public Works United States S., 89th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 209 (1966) [hereinafter Hearings on S.3112 and S.3400 (statement of Dr.
Robert A. Kehoe, Univ. of Cincinnati Coll. of Med).
152. Sidney Kaye & Paul Reznikoff, A Comparative Study of the Lead Content of
Street Dirts in New York City in 1924 and 1934, 29 J. INDus. HYGIENE & TOXICOLOGY
178, 178 (1947). This report was virtually ignored.
153. J. Julian Chisolm, Jr. & Harold E. Harrison, The Exposure of Children to
Lead, 18 PEDIATRICS 943, 947 tbl.II (1956).
154. Theodore H. Ingalls et al., Lead Poisoning in Philadelphia, 1955-1960, 3
ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 575, 575, 576 tbl.1 (1961).
155. See CHRISTIAN WARREN, BRUSH wiTH DEATH: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF LEAD
POISONING 205 (2000).
156. See id. at 205-06.
157. J.R. Goldsmith & C.A. Hexter, Respiratory Exposure to Lead: Epidemiological
and Experimental Dose-Response Relationships, 158 Sci. 132, 133 (1967).
2005-2006]
27
48 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
sentatives of the lead industry.158 As with previous studies in-
volving the lead industry, the PHS continued to permit lead
industry representatives to control the dissemination of informa-
tion about the studies' results. 159 Based on these studies, the PHS
declared in 1965 that existing levels of lead in the ambient air did
not pose a significant threat to public health.160
In Senate hearings held in 1966, Dr. Robert Kehoe stated that
"no other hygienic problem in the field of air pollution has been
investigated so intensively, over such a prolonged period of time,
and with such definitive results."16 1 As a result of these studies,
Kehoe declared, "this specific set of problems has been brought to
such a point of understanding, in relation to the public health, as
to remove it from the realm of urgency and to consign it into that
group of hygienic problems on which a watchful and effective sur-
veillance should be kept."1 62
Ironically, it was the elemental nature of lead, the very fea-
ture that makes it so hazardous, that the industry cited to pro-
mote the notion that some human exposure is inevitable. 163 In a
finger-pointing theme that was frequently repeated in subsequent
regulatory proceedings, Kehoe argued that humans were exposed
to more lead in food and drink than from air emissions. 164 Kehoe
maintained that this should not be of concern because studies
have demonstrated clearly that the quantity of lead which is be-
ing absorbed daily by the average adult citizen of the United
States who is not subjected to occupational or otherwise unu-
sual types of exposure to lead, is balanced for all practical pur-
poses by the excretion of a corresponding quantity of lead.165
Yet even Kehoe conceded that "[1]ead poisoning in industry is
still one of the most frequent occupational diseases ... despite the
158. Gregory S. Wetstone & Jan Goldman, Chronology of Events Surrounding the
Ethyl Decision, in JuDIcLL REVIEW OF SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY: INTERNATIONAL HAR-
VESTER AND ETHYL CASES RECONSIDERED 3 (D.L. Davis et al. eds., 1981).
159. Id. at 4.
160. See WARREN, supra note 155, at 209-10.
161. See Hearings on S.3112 and S.3400, supra note 151, at 204 (statement of Dr.
Robert A. Kehoe).
162. See id.
163. "We have known only for a relatively short time ... that lead is an inevitable
element in the surface of the earth, in its vegetation, in its animal life, and that there
is no way in which man has ever been able to escape the absorption of lead while
living on this planet." Id. at 206.
164. Id. at 209.
165. Id. at 206, 220.
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fact that we know how to prevent it."166 However, Felix Wormser,
former president of the Lead Industries Association (LIA), main-
tained at the same hearings that "occupational hazards can now
be controlled and avoided" since all states had accepted a volun-
tary industry consensus standard for exposures to lead.167
Wormser blamed "misdiagnosis" for "unduly increased public con-
cern about lead."' 68 He claimed that he had seen "case after case
of press reports alleging lead as the cause of damage where lead
was not even used or involved."169 He praised the manufacturers
of children's furniture and toys for eliminating the use of lead-
based paints, and he noted that the American Standards Associa-
tion had worked with LIA to specify "a limit on lead content for
interior paints." 70 Wormser concluded that "more is known about
the biological effects of lead than about almost any other air-borne
substance." 17 He assured the committee that "[oln the basis of
this scientific knowledge, I can positively assert that lead consti-
tutes no public health hazard in America today."172
Kehoe also sought to create the impression that further sur-
veillance would be conducted to ensure that any public health
problems would be detected before they became serious. When
pressed as to whether or not it would be desirable to replace gaso-
line lead additives if a substitute could be developed that did not
have toxic effects, Dr. Kehoe maintained that it would first be nec-
essary to investigate the substitutes extensively because he be-
lieved "as a matter of principle, that we must investigate every
material that we introduce into our environment... because there
are unknown effects."' 73
Clair Patterson, a scientist with the California Institute of
Technology, challenged Kehoe's claims. At the same Senate hear-
ings in 1966, Patterson criticized public health officials and the
academic community for defending and promoting "ideas that may
be dangerous to the health of all Americans."' 74 Based on his own
166. Id. at 205.
167. Id. at 233, 235-36 (statement of Felix E. Wormser, Consultant and Former
President, Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc.).
168. Id. at 235.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 239.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 207 (statement of Dr. Kehoe).
174. Id. at 312 (statement of Dr. Clair C. Patterson, Ph. D., California Institute of
Technology).
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calculations concerning lead levels near California freeways and
human absorption of airborne lead, Patterson declared that ex-
isting levels of lead in the ambient air did pose a threat to public
health.175 Noting that residents of urban areas had significantly
higher levels of lead in their blood than residents of rural areas,
Patterson declared that this could only be explained by the signifi-
cant increase in lead emissions from gasoline combustion. 176
In response to these concerns, Congress in 1967 took a little-
noticed but significant step when it adopted air quality legislation
requiring that fuel additives be registered. 177 This legislation
amended the 1965 Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act, 178
which had initiated the process of establishing federal emissions
standards for new motor vehicles. Regulatory action calling for
reduced levels of hydrocarbons also reduced levels of lead in ambi-
ent air.179 As the deadline for reducing hydrocarbon emissions ap-
proached, the only available technology to achieve it was the
catalytic converter, a platinum-based device that increased the
overall efficiency of gasoline fuel combustion.180 Because the cata-
lytic converter was "poisoned" by lead, vehicles using it required
lead-free gasoline. In 1970, President Nixon asked Congress to
promote the development of lead-free gasoline by imposing a fed-
eral tax on lead additives.' 8 '
C. The Asbestos Tragedy
Like the history of human exposure to lead, the history of as-
bestos exposure is replete with instances of early warnings of po-
tentially catastrophic harm that failed to generate effective
preventive regulation. Elevated levels of mortality among asbes-
175. See id. at 314.
176. See id. at 314-15. Subsequent research by Patterson and Settle suggested that
modern levels of lead, in the environment and in humans, were far from a "natural"
background, but rather represented an enormous contamination due to centuries of
human use. See Dorothy M. Settle & Clair C. Patterson, Lead in Albacore: Guide to
Lead Pollution in Americans, 207 Sci. 1167, 1170-73 (1980).
177. Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 210, 81 Stat. 485, 502 (1967).
178. Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992
(1965).
179. See V.M. Thomas, The Elimination of Lead in Gasoline, 20 ANNuAL REV. EN-
ERGY ENV'T 301, 316-17 (1995).
180. For a brief description of the catalytic converter, see Carbon Monoxide Kills,
Carbon Monoxide Emissions, http://www.carbonmonoxidekills.com/carbon-monoxide_
emissions.htm (last updated Jan. 11, 2005).
181. Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., President to Propose Congress Adopt Tax on
Lead Additives in Motor Fuels, 1 Env't Rep. (BNA) 71 (1970).
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tos workers were reported in 1906, a few years after a London doc-
tor, H. Montague Murray, had reported the first case of asbestosis,
a deadly respiratory disease ultimately linked to asbestos expo-
sure. 8 2 In 1924, the first case of a death clearly attributed to as-
bestosis appeared in the medical literature. 8 3 In the late 1920s,
studies of elevated mortality rates among asbestos workers were
published.18 4 These studies inspired the British Parliament, in
1931, to enact legislation requiring improved ventilation and dust
suppression in the asbestos-textile industry.18 5
The U.S. asbestos industry succeeded in suppressing evidence
of elevated mortality rates among its workers during the 1930s,
even as its insurers quietly moved to restrict coverage of workers
exposed to asbestos.' 8 6 Workers in other industries whose lungs
were scarred through inhalation of silica filed tort suits in massive
numbers during this decade.'8 7 The use of new, mechanical drill-
ing and milling technologies early in the twentieth century had
dramatically increased worker exposure to silica dust. Lawsuits
seeking more than a billion dollars in compensation for silicosis
were pending in 1934.188 While many attributed the escalation of
silicosis claims to the onset of the Great Depression, the claims
created a crisis for the insurance industry, which responded by
lobbying successfully for states to expand workers' compensation
to cover occupational diseases such as silicosis and asbestosis, pre-
empting tort litigation against employers. 8 9
During World War II, 4.5 million Americans working in ship-
yards were exposed to dangerous levels of asbestos, which was
widely used as a form of insulation.190 Two decades later, in Octo-
ber 1964, Dr. Irving Selikoff s epidemiological studies of asbestos-
insulation workers established that these workers were experienc-
ing alarming rates of asbestosis and were dying of lung cancer at
182. PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL
11-12 (1985).
183. Id. at 13.
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 13-14, 120.
187. See Andrew P. Morriss & Susan E. Dudley, Defining What to Regulate: Silica
& the Problem of Regulatory Categorization 27 (Case W. Reserve Univ. Sch. of Law
Case Research Paper Series, Mercatus Ctr. at George Mason Univ. Working Paper in
Regulatory Studies, No. 05-21, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=781684.
188. Id.
189. See BRODEUR, supra note 182, at 16-18.
190. Id. at 120.
2005-2006]
31
52 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
seven times the expected rate. 191 The evidence associating friable
asbestos insulation with troubling rates of asbestosis, mesothe-
lioma, and lung cancer was so compelling that the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) banned the use of such products shortly
after it was given the authority to do so in the 1970s. 192 By the
year 2000, an avalanche of tort litigation had been filed against
manufacturers of asbestos products, including more than 600,000
lawsuits against more than 6000 defendants, resulting in $54 bil-
lion in damages and litigation costs. 193 More importantly, it is es-
timated that between 1979 and 2001, more than 230,000 deaths in
the United States have been caused by exposure to asbestos. 194
EPA's difficulties in developing a coherent strategy for controlling
the risks posed by huge quantities of asbestos in schools and
buildings eventually convinced the agency to attempt to phaseout
remaining uses of asbestos, as discussed below.
D. Precautionary Regulation by the Courts: The Reserve
Mining Decision
While the hazards of lead and asbestos had become well
known by the late 1960s, uncertainty over the health effects of a
newly discovered hazard forced U.S. courts to address the ques-
tion of whether a precautionary approach should be employed.
The case, which arose in Minnesota, involved an effort to force the
Reserve Mining Company (Reserve) to stop discharging 67,000
tons of taconite tailings daily into Lake Superior. 95 Following a
191. Id. at 30-31.
192. See Asbestos and Mercury: Proposed Amendments to National Emission Stan-
dards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 39 Fed. Reg. 38,063, 38,064 (Oct. 25, 2974); Na-
tional Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Asbestos, Beryllium, and
Mercury, 38 Fed. Reg. 8819, 8820 (Apr. 6, 1973). Using its authority under the Clean
Air Act, which had been enacted in 1970, EPA listed asbestos as a hazardous air pol-
lutant on March 31, 1971. On April 6, 1973, EPA prohibited spray applications of
products containing more than 1 percent asbestos by weight; and it prohibited any
"visible emissions" in milling, manufacturing, or demolition. R.D. Brownson, Current
and Historical American Asbestos Regulations, 53 MONALDI ARCHIVES CHEST Dis-
EASES 181, 182 (1998).
193. Morriss & Dudley, supra note 187, at 61 (citing STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL.,
ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS AND COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT (2002)).
194. Environmental Working Group, Governmental Data on Asbestos Mortality,
http://www.ewg.org/reports/asbestos/maps/government data.php#moreinfo (last vis-
ited Oct. 18, 2005).
195. Much has been written about the history of this case. For a new review of its
history, see John S. Applegate, The Story of Reserve Mining: Managing Scientific Un-
certainty in Environmental Regulation, in ENVmONMENTAL LAw STORIES 43 (Richard
J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005) [hereinafter Story of Reserve Mining].
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two-year interstate enforcement conference that heard hundreds
of witnesses and compiled thousands of exhibits, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) brought suit against Reserve in February
1972. The suit, which was joined by the States of Michigan, Min-
nesota, and Wisconsin, as well as several environmental groups,
was brought under federal and state common law and for viola-
tions of the Refuse Act,196 the Clean Water Act (CWA), 197 and
state air and water pollution regulations.1 98
After an activist, a geologist, and a National Water Quality
Laboratory scientist discovered that the taconite tailings released
fibers structurally similar to asbestos in a source of drinking
water serving Duluth, Minnesota, a city with an exposed popula-
tion of 200,000, the case focused on whether ingestion of the fibers
posed cancer risks similar to those associated with inhalation of
asbestos. 99 The scientific evidence was inconclusive, despite
court-sanctioned efforts to sample the tissues of recently diseased
residents of Duluth. Federal District Judge Miles Lord ultimately
determined that although there was no conclusive evidence of a
hazard, the taconite tailings present in Duluth's drinking water
posed a significant health risk because they were structurally sim-
ilar to asbestos. 200 He then conducted a separate trial to deter-
mine the best means for halting the discharges. After becoming
frustrated with the company's intransigence on the remedy issue,
he issued an order requiring that the discharges cease
immediately. 20 '
Reserve appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, which issued, and later renewed, a stay of Judge Lord's
order to avoid a shutdown of the plant.20 2 In an opinion authored
by Judge Myron Bright, a three-judge panel emphatically rejected
the notion that precaution should take precedence in the face of
scientific uncertainty:
196. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, §13, 30 Stat. 1121 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000)).
197. 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387 (2000).
198. Story of Reserve Mining, supra note 195, at 57; United States v. Reserve Min-
ing Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492,
492 (8th Cir. 1975).
199. See Story of Reserve Mining, supra note 195, at 44-45, 48-49, 58-61.
200. See id. at 60-61.
201. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 21 (D. Minn. 1974),
modified and remanded by 514 F.2d 492, 535-42 (8th Cir. 1975).
202. Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1086 (8th Cir. 1974).
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[A]lthough Reserve's discharges represent a possible medical
danger, they have not in this case been proven to amount to a
health hazard. The discharges may or may not result in detri-
mental health effects, but, for the present, that is simply un-
known ....
We do not think that a bare risk of the unknown can
amount to proof in this case. Plaintiffs have failed to prove that
a demonstrable health hazard exists. This failure, we hasten to
add, is not reflective of any weakness which it is within their
power to cure, but rather, given the current state of medical and
scientific knowledge, plaintiffs' case is based only on medical hy-
pothesis and is simply beyond proof.
We believe that Judge Lord carried his analysis one step
beyond the evidence. Since testimony clearly established that
an assessment of the risk was made impossible by the absence
of medical knowledge, Judge Lord apparently took the position
that all uncertainties should be resolved in favor of health
safety. Since the appropriate threshold level for safe toleration
of fibers was unknown,, the district court tipped the balance in
favor of attempting to protect against the unknown and simply
assumed that Reserve's discharge presents a health hazard ....
[T]he district court's determination to resolve all doubts in favor
of health safety represents a legislative policy judgment, not a
judicial one ....
... Although we are sympathetic to the uncertainties facing
the residents of the North Shore, we are a court of law, governed
by rules of proof, and unknowns may not be substituted for proof
of a demonstrable hazard to the public health.20 3
By rejecting a precautionary approach to regulation, the
panel's decision alarmed federal and state environmental officials.
In response, "[a] bill was introduced in Congress to shift the bur-
den of proof to polluters to prove the safety of their discharges
once it was shown that they presented a reasonable risk of being a
threat to public health."20 4 Russell Peterson, then Chairman of
the Council on Environmental Quality, supported this proposed
legislation, by arguing:
Because of the latent health effects of carcinogens it will be
more than 10 years before the magnitude of the health risk to
the people of Duluth and Silver Bay will be fully realized, and
203. Id. at 1083-84.
204. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 353 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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unfortunately it will be based upon the fate of over 200,000 peo-
ple. Even a few more days of additional exposure pose an un-
necessary and unacceptable risk to the residents of the area.20 5
Although Congress did not enact this proposed legislation,
Reserve ultimately was forced to end its discharges into Lake Su-
perior. The Eighth Circuit panel refused to endorse the district
court's precautionary approach to respond to a potential health
hazard, but it concluded that the company was likely to lose on the
claims that its discharges violated the terms of its permit.20 6
Thus, the court conditioned its stay "upon assurances that there
will be a speedy termination of Reserve's discharges into Lake Su-
perior and control of its emissions into the air."20 7
After negotiations with Reserve failed to produce agreement
on a plan to abate the discharges, the Eighth Circuit announced a
briefing schedule for hearing Reserve's appeal en banc. The
court's en banc decision upheld Judge Lord's issuance of an in-
junction to require abatement of the discharges into Lake Supe-
rior; but rather than requiring that they be halted immediately, it
gave Reserve "reasonable time" to abate them "on reasonable
terms."208 The court stated that "[t]he United States and the
other plaintiffs have established that Reserve's discharges into
the air and water give rise to a potential threat to the public
health. The risk to public health is of sufficient gravity to be le-
gally cognizable and calls for an abatement order on reasonable
terms."20 9 However, it noted that "[n]o harm to the public health
has been shown to have occurred to this date and the danger to
health is not imminent."210
But the court justified its decision to require abatement of the
hazard on the ground that "[tihe evidence calls for preventive and
205. To Promote and Protect the Free Flow of Interstate Commerce Without Unrea-
sonable Damage to the Environment; To Assure that Activities Which Affect Interstate
Commerce Will Not Unreasonably Injure Environmental Rights; To Provide a Right of
Action for Relief for Protection of the Environment from Unreasonable Infringement by
Activities Which Affect Interstate Commerce and to Establish the Right of All Citizens
to the Protection, Preservation, and Enhancement of the Environment: Hearing on S.
1104 Amendment No. 1814 Before the Subcomm. on Environment of the Comm. on
Commerce, 93rd Cong. 8 (1974) (letter from Russell W. Peterson to Hon. Wallace H.
Johnson).
206. Reserve Mining Co., 498 F.2d at 1074, 1084.
207. Id. at 1084-85.
208. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 500 (8th Cir. 1975).
209. Id.
210. Id.
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precautionary steps."211 Finding no reason to require Reserve to
shut down immediately, the court granted it "a reasonable oppor-
tunity and a reasonable time period to convert its Minnesota taco-
nite operations to on-land disposal of taconite tailings and to
restrict air emissions at its Silver Bay plant, or to close its existing
Minnesota taconite-pelletizing operations."212 Because the court
believed that the "evidence suggests that the threat to public
health from the air emissions is more significant than that from
the water discharge," it directed Reserve to "take reasonable im-
mediate steps to reduce its air emissions." 213
The Eighth Circuit's en banc decision in Reserve serves as an
important precedent for the application of the precautionary prin-
ciple in the United States. It represents an explicit recognition by
the court that in circumstances where science simply cannot re-
solve the question whether something poses an environmental
risk, it still may be appropriate to require precautionary measures
to be taken. Thus, the court agreed that it was reasonable to re-
quire abatement of the tailings discharges even in the face of un-
certainty concerning their actual impact on human health.
Therefore, the Eighth Circuit upheld the trial court's order di-
recting Reserve to phaseout disposal of taconite tailings in Lake
Superior. 21 4
After bitter battles between Reserve and Judge Lord contin-
ued on remand, the Eighth Circuit ultimately removed Judge Lord
from the case for exhibiting what it deemed to be pro-plaintiff bias
and substantial disregard for its mandate. 21 5 In decisions from
May and July 1976, Judge Devitt found Reserve to have violated
the law, fined the company heavily, imposed sanctions for its mis-
conduct during discovery, and gave it one year to halt all dis-
charges.21 6 The Eighth Circuit basically upheld these decisions in
full. 2 17
211. See id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 499-500 (8th Cir. 1975).
215. Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181, 185 (8th Cir. 1976).
216. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 412 F. Supp. 705, 713-14 (D. Minn.
1976) (May decision); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 417 F. Supp. 789, 791 (D.
Minn. 1976) (July decision).
217. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 543 F.2d 1210, 1211 (8th Cir. 1976).
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E. Legislation Authorizing Precautionary Regulation
and the Ethyl Decision
During the 1970s, Congress adopted far-reaching legislation
establishing comprehensive programs to protect the environ-
ment.218 These laws-the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA),219 the Clean Air Act, 220 the CWA,221 and the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act (TSCA)222-represent a sharp departure from
the common law approach to environmental protection by endors-
ing precautionary measures to prevent environmental damage
before it occurs. The first major federal statute adopted during
this period-the National Environmental Policy Act-directs fed-
eral agencies, before undertaking any major actions, to prepare
and consider detailed assessments of their environmental impacts
and of alternatives to them.223 This environmental assessment
requirement has been widely emulated throughout the world, and
it has become a central element of the environmental protection
infrastructure in many countries. 224 By requiring agencies to
carefully examine the prospective consequences of their actions,
NEPA enhances the ability of decision-makers to take precaution-
ary action.
The first major federal regulatory statute Congress adopted
was the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970.225 This legislation
endorsed precautionary regulation by requiring the newly created
EPA to set national ambient air quality standards to protect pub-
lic health, with a margin of safety built into the standards.
226
This legislation also directed EPA to set standards that would re-
quire at least a 90-percent reduction in hydrocarbon and carbon
monoxide emissions from new motor vehicles. 227 Congress also
218. A superb history of these developments is presented in RICHARD J. LAzARUS,
THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004).
219. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000).
220. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
221. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
222. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000).
223. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
224. More than eighty countries and twenty-five states have adopted some form of
environmental impact assessment requirement. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUAL-
ITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AF-
TER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS (1997), available at http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/nepa25fn.pdf.
225. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676.
226. Id. § 109(b)(1), 84 Stat. at 1680 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) ("standards
the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator,
based on such [air quality] criteria and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are
requisite to protect the public health")).
227. Id. § 202(b)(1)(A), 84 Stat. at 1690.
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authorized the EPA to control or to prohibit the use of any fuel
additive whose emission products "will endanger the public health
or welfare. '228 To meet the required 90-percent reduction in con-
ventional pollutants, new automobiles had to be equipped with
catalytic converters. 229 Because lead additives in gasoline render
catalytic converters ineffective in controlling exhaust emissions,
the use of leaded gasoline in the new vehicle fleet had to be
prohibited. 230
In January 1971, the EPA announced that it was considering
controls on lead additives in gasoline not only because of lead's
incompatibility with catalytic converters, but also because of con-
cern over the effects of lead emissions on public health. 231 In Feb-
ruary 1972, the EPA proposed regulations to require a phased
reduction in the lead content of leaded gasoline to 1.25 grams per
gallon (gpg) by 1977.232 The EPA based its proposed limits on the
lead content of gasoline on a health assessment document that
concluded that airborne lead levels exceeding 2 ug/m3 were associ-
ated with a sufficient risk of adverse physiological effects to en-
danger public health.233 However, in January 1973, when the
EPA adopted regulations requiring the use of lead-free gasoline in
cars with catalytic converters, it deferred adoption of limits on the
lead content of gasoline because of uncertainties concerning its as-
sessment of the evidence of the health effects of airborne lead.234
The EPA Administrator determined that it was "difficult if
not impossible" to identify the precise level of airborne lead that
would endanger health.235 However, he re-proposed the 1.25gpg
limit based on a new health assessment document that considered
the cumulative effect of airborne lead exposure on total human
exposure to lead.236 The Administrator emphasized that there
228. Id. § 211(c)(1)(A), 84 Stat. at 1698 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7545(c)(1)(A)).
229. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 554-55.
230. See Thomas, supra note 179, at 316-17.
231. Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Regulation of Fuel Additives, 36
Fed. Reg. 1486 (Jan. 30, 1971).
232. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Lead and Phosphorus Additives in
Motor Vehicle Gasoline, 37 Fed. Reg. 3882, 3883 (proposed Feb. 17, 1972) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
233. Id. at 3882; EPA, HEALTH HAZARDS OF LEAD 8-9 (1972).
234. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 38 Fed. Reg. 1254, 1254 (Jan. 10,
1973).
235. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 38
Fed. Reg. 1258, 1258 (Jan. 10, 1973) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
236. Id. at 1259.
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was evidence that human exposure to airborne lead occurred not
only through direct absorption of lead in the lungs, but also as a
result of atmospheric deposition on soil, another source of signifi-
cant exposure to children.237 The EPA's new proposal required
phased reductions in the lead content of gasoline beginning in
1975 and culminating in 1978 with the 1.25gpg limit.238
In response to a lawsuit by environmentalists, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia ordered the EPA in October
1973 to decide within thirty days whether or not lead additives in
gasoline should be regulated for health reasons.239 In November
1973, the EPA issued a revised health assessment document that
determined lead emissions from gasoline "will endanger the public
health."240 In December 1973, EPA adopted the proposed limit on
the lead content of gasoline after modifying it to base the standard
on grams of lead per gallon of all gasoline produced. 241 This modi-
fication was designed in part to encourage greater production of
unleaded gasoline because it would permit a refinery to increase
the lead content of the leaded gasoline it produced as it expanded
production of unleaded gasoline. 242 The standard required large
refineries to begin phased reductions in lead usage on January 1,
1975, with small refineries to follow on January 1, 1977.243 By
January 1, 1979, all refineries were required to comply with a
standard of 0.5 gpg for all gasoline produced, 244 which was
equivalent to the 1.5-grams-per-leaded-gallon standard.
Lead-additive manufacturers challenged EPA's decision in
court. In December 1974, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit struck down the regu-
lations by a two-one vote, with Judge J. Skelly Wright dissent-
ing.245 In a majority opinion by Judge Wilkey, the court held that
there was insufficient evidence to prove that lead emissions "will
endanger the public health or welfare," as required by the Clean
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1260.
239. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (citing Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, No. 72-2233 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
240. See Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 10 (discussing EPA's POSITION ON THE HEALTH
IMPLICATIONS OF AIRBORNE LEAD (Nov. 28, 1973)).
241. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 38 Fed. Reg. 33,734, 33,734 (Dec. 6,
1973) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80, as amended).
242. See id. at 33,739.
243. Id. at 33,739-40.
244. Id. at 33,741.
245. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 5 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20,096, 20,096-97 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
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Air Act.246 The court agreed that "the case against auto lead
emissions is a speculative and inconclusive one at best."247
The EPA appealed this decision to the full court, which agreed
to rehear the case. In March 1976, the court reversed the three-
judge panel's decision by a five-four vote and upheld the lead stan-
dard.248 In a decision that stands as a landmark in its endorse-
ment of precautionary regulation, the court ruled that there was
sufficient evidence to regulate lead additives, even though it could
not be proven with certainty that they endanger public health.249
In his majority opinion, Judge Wright noted the precautionary na-
ture of the Clean Air Act's regulatory mandate: "Regulatory action
may be taken before the threatened harm occurs; indeed the very
existence of... precautionary legislation would seem to demand
that regulatory action precede, and, optimally, prevent, the per-
ceived threat."250
The TEL manufacturers argued that there was no definitive
proof that emissions of lead from gasoline caused harm. 251 They
maintained that EPA was required to present some "dispositive
study" to demonstrate that lead additives in gasoline had caused
lead poisoning in individuals. 252 The court acknowledged the lack
of "hard proof of any danger," but it rejected the notion that such
proof was necessary before precautionary regulation could be im-
plemented.253 "Undoubtedly, certainty is the scientific ideal to the
extent that even science can be certain of its truth. But certainty
in the complexities of environmental medicine may be achievable
only after the fact .... Awaiting certainty will often allow for only
reactive, not preventive regulation."254
After reviewing the 10,000-page record, the court focused on
three EPA conclusions that the lead additive manufacturers had
challenged:
(1) that, based on a prelimina.ry determination that blood lead
levels of 40 pg are indicative of danger to health, elevated
blood lead levels 'exist to a small but significant extent in
246. Id. at 20,114-15.
247. Id. at 20,097.
248. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 6, 11, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
249. See id. at 17.
250. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
251. See id. at 12.
252. See id. at 37.
253. Id. at 8, 17.
254. Id. at 25 (footnote omitted).
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the general adult population and to a very great extent
among children' . . . ; (2) that airborne lead is directly ab-
sorbed in the body through respiration to a degree that con-
stitutes a significant risk to public health; and (3) that
airborne lead falls to the ground where it mixes with dust
and poses a significant risk to the health of urban
children.255
The court observed that while no specific blood lead level could be
identified as the threshold for danger, the 40pg level was a con-
servative standard; and that studies, including those of the blood
lead levels of workers in various occupational groups who work
outside and whose only exposure to lead is through the ambient
air, justified EPA's first conclusion.256 The court found that theo-
retical, epidemiological, and clinical studies supported the second
conclusion; and it upheld the third conclusion as a hypothesis that
is consistent with known information about high lead concentra-
tions in dust in urban areas and the behavior of children.25 7
The court rejected the industry's claim that a "dispositive
study" had to support EPA's determination, noting that "[b]y its
nature, scientific evidence is cumulative." 258 The court noted the
difficulties inherent in determining whether or not lead emissions
endanger health, including the existence of multiple sources of
human exposure to lead and the difficulties of conducting con-
trolled experiments on humans. 259 However, it upheld EPA's reg-
ulation by emphasizing the precautionary purpose of the statute:
Where a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence diffi-
cult to come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the
frontiers of scientific knowledge, the regulations designed to
protect the public health, and the decision that of an expert ad-
ministrator, we will not demand rigorous step-by-step proof of
cause and effect. Such proof may be impossible to obtain if the
precautionary purpose of the statute is to be served. 260
The Ethyl decision remains a landmark in environmental law
because of its endorsement of the precautionary principle long
before it became a staple of global environmental policy. The deci-
255. Id. at 38 (citation omitted).
256. Id. at 38-41.
257. Id. at 41-46.
258. Id. at 37-38.
259. See id. at 9.
260. Id. at 28 (footnote omitted).
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sion established that precautionary regulation could be based "on
the inconclusive but suggestive results of numerous studies," sug-
gesting that exposure to a substance was likely to endanger health
even in the absence of conclusive proof that such adverse health
effects actually had occurred. 261 It also indicated that courts
would be deferential in reviewing the judgment of the EPA Ad-
ministrator in assessing the significance of scientific evidence.
Shortly after the Ethyl decision, Congress amended the Clean
Air Act to change the standard for regulating fuel additives from
"will endanger public health or welfare" to "may reasonably be an-
ticipated to endanger the public health or welfare."26 2 This essen-
tially codified the Ethyl court's approach and confirmed EPA's
authority to regulate fuel additives on the basis of information
that they are likely to produce harm, without first requiring that
they be shown to have produced such harm.
In his dissent, Judge Wilkey argued that,
If there can be found potential harm from lead in exhaust emis-
sions, the best (and only convincing) proof of such potential
harm is what has occurred in the past (either in 50 years of
practical usage or in laboratory experimentation), from which
the Administrator can logically deduce that the same factors
will produce the same harm in the future.263
Under his view, the fact that lead has been emitted from automo-
biles for so many years would require some showing that harm
has actually been caused by them, even if a more relaxed standard
might be applicable when considering regulation of new
substances.
Even though the Seven-Cities Study had found that only a
very small percentage (0.15 percent) of adults had elevated blood-
lead levels, EPA argued that the study was methodologically
flawed, and had relied on evidence of elevated lead levels in occu-
pational groups (e.g., mailmen, service station employees) whose
only exposure to lead would be through air emissions. 26 4 While
Judge Wilkey asserted that EPA was simply "picking and choos-
ing" data to support its conclusion, the majority supported EPA's
261. Id. at 37-38.
262. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 401(e), 91 Stat. 685
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(1)(A)).
263. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 95 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
264. See id. at 40-41.
[Vol. 23
42https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol23/iss1/3
WHO'S AFRAID?
approach. 265 As discussed in Section H below, subsequent events
have decisively confirmed the wisdom of EPA's precautionary
approach.
F. Action to Phaseout Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and
Other Ozone-Depleting Substances
Although it was well known that exposure to lead could harm
humans, the true uncertainty in Ethyl concerned the degree of
human exposure to lead caused by combustion of lead additives in
gasoline. The most dramatic instance in which U.S. regulatory
policy has responded to purely theoretical risks is its response to
the theory that CFCs could damage the earth's ozone layer. In
1974, two scientists from the University of California-Sherry
Rowland and Mario Molina-published a paper suggesting that
the ozone layer could be damaged by a family of chemicals once
hailed as a miracle of modern science. 266 CFCs, chemicals used in
a wide variety of industrial applications including aerosol propel-
lants, foam blowing, air conditioning, and solvents, were discov-
ered in the 1920s by Thomas Midgely, the same chemist who
discovered TEL.267 At the time of Midgely's discovery, CFCs were
considered to be a marvelous advance for public health and safety
because they could be used to replace highly toxic materials that
formerly had been used to insulate refrigeration equipment. 268
Beginning in the 1950s, CFCs had become widely used, particu-
larly as propellants in popular aerosol spray deodorants. Rowland
and Molina hypothesized that CFCs would reach the upper atmos-
phere, where they could be broken apart by the intense energy of
the sun, releasing chlorine. 269 The chlorine would then act as a
catalyst, converting ozone (03) to oxygen, destroying the Earth's
protective ozone shield.270
Rowland and Molina's study sparked considerable research
that confirmed that their hypothesis was theoretically sound,
though at the time it was not possible to prove definitively that
CFCs actually were destroying the ozone layer. As publicity fo-
cused on potential harm to the ozone layer, American consumers
stopped buying aerosol sprays (including those without CFCs); in
265. See id. at 37-38, 103.
266. See CAGIN & DRAY, supra note 80, at 171, 178, 185, 188-89.
267. See id. at 64-66.
268. See id. at 66-67.
269. Id. at 180-81.
270. Id. at 181.
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less than two years the market for products with such sprays
dropped by two-thirds without any government regulation. 271
Competing manufacturers began advertising that their products
did not contain chemicals thought to harm the ozone layer. While
disputing the notion that CFCs threatened the ozone layer, indus-
try eventually agreed, after several states initiated regulatory
proceedings, 272 that federal regulation would be preferable to po-
tentially conflicting state standards. In March 1978, EPA (under
TSCA), the Food and Drug Administration, and the Consumer
Product Safety Commission jointly issued regulations to limit the
use of CFCs in "nonessential" aerosol propellants (military and
medical uses were exempted). 273
Even before international research could pinpoint the role of
CFCs in ozone depletion, discovery of an ozone "hole" demon-
strated the vulnerability of the ozone layer. This contributed to a
heightened sense of urgency that spurred international negotia-
tions based on the framework established by the Vienna Conven-
tion. Four negotiating sessions, beginning in Geneva in December
1986, culminated in the signing of the Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer in September 1987.274 The
Protocol called for a freeze on production and consumption of
CFCs and halons at 1986 levels, followed by a 50-percent reduc-
tion in CFC use by industrialized countries over a ten-year
period. 275
G. The Supreme Court's Benzene Decision
Congress often has mandated that technology-based stan-
dards be promulgated to reduce environmental and occupational
risks. The Clean Air Act requires EPA to establish technology-
based standards that must be met by new or modified major sta-
tionary sources and by companies that emit hazardous air pollu-
tants.276 The Clean Water Act requires EPA to set technology-
based effluent limits on discharges of water pollutants on an in-
271. See id. at 205-06.
272. Id. at 206.
273. See id. at 213; Chlorofluorocarbons in Various Products as Propellants in Self-
Pressurized Containers, 43 Fed. Reg. 11,301, 11,301-02, 11,316, 11,319-20 (Mar. 17,
1978).
274. RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMAcY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFE-
GUARDING THE PLANET 69-76 (1991).
275. Id. at 87.
276. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7412.
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dustry-wide basis.277 The Occupational Health and Safety Act re-
quires the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) to promulgate an occupational health standard that "most
adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best
available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impair-
ment of health or functional capacity," even if exposed to the haz-
ard throughout his working life.2 78 Because technology-based
standards are not based on assessment of the extent of likely
harm caused by regulated pollutants, they often are viewed as an
example of precautionary regulation.2 7 9
Fears that judicial endorsement of precautionary regulation
in both Ethyl and Reserve Mining could spawn overregulation
were calmed somewhat when the U.S. Supreme Court issued its
"benzene decision" in 1980. A plurality of the Court concluded
that a statutory command to establish a standard that "'most ade-
quately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best
available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impair-
ment of health or functional capacity,"' even if exposed to the haz-
ard throughout his working life, did not automatically require
reducing exposure to carcinogens to the lowest feasible level.28 0
Instead it held that OSHA must first perform a risk assessment to
establish that the risk is "significant" and that it could be appreci-
ably reduced by the standard it ultimately promulgated. 28' Thus,
the Court conditioned precautionary regulation on the making of
threshold findings that such regulation would appreciably reduce
risks that appear to be substantial.
The Court's plurality decision did not represent a wholesale
rejection of the precautionary approach to regulation. Rather, it
expressly endorsed the notion that precautionary regulation could
be undertaken in the face of uncertainty, while the Court devel-
oped its own common law concerning what evidence was neces-
sary to trigger regulatory action under the Occupational Safety
and Health Act. The plurality also endorsed the use of conserva-
tive default assumptions in risk assessment ("so long as they are
supported by a body of reputable scientific thought"), and it speci-
277. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b).
278. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000).
279. See generally MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 13 (arguing that greater acceptance
of the precautionary principle in Europe is reflected in greater emphasis on technol-
ogy-based regulation in European countries than in the United States).
280. Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 612, 615 (1980)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5)).
281. Id. at 653, 659.
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fled that risk assessment need not be quantitative in circum-
stances where such analysis was not possible given the extent of
uncertainty.28 2
By requiring OSHA to assess risks and to determine that they
are "significant" enough to warrant regulation, the Supreme
Court placed a greater burden on agencies seeking to adopt pre-
cautionary regulation. While this regulatory threshold in itself
does not appear to be a significant barrier to regulation, the
Court's decision created yet another obstacle for an agency al-
ready having great difficulty setting standards. 28 3 It also meant
that workers had to tolerate exposure to dangerous levels of ben-
zene for nearly a decade longer than OSHA initially had intended
when it promulgated an emergency temporary standard in 1977,
which was invalidated in court.28 4 It was not until 1987 that
OSHA ultimately lowered the permissible exposure limit for ben-
zene to the very level it had sought to adopt on an emergency basis
a decade earlier. 28 5
OSHA currently is considering a new permissible exposure
limit for silica to replace the now-woefully outdated national con-
sensus standard it initially adopted. 28 6 Despite periodic asser-
tions that the problem of worker exposure to silica has been
solved, today between 200 and 300 workers die of silicosis each
year.28 7 Thus, a problem that commanded national attention sev-
enty years ago when the Gauley Bridge disaster was publicized
remains serious due to regulatory policies that have been insuffi-
ciently precautionary. 2 8
H. The Phaseout of TEL from Gasoline
Despite the Ethyl decision endorsing precautionary regula-
tion, a serious attempt to repeal lead phasedown came shortly af-
282. See id. at 656. These aspects of the Court's decision have been criticized by
opponents of the precautionary principle. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 30, at 856 n.29.
283. THOMAS 0. McGARTY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED
PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 57 (1993).
(OSHA has been able to update only a small fraction of the initial industry consensus
standards that it adopted, and it has not been able to implement most of the recom-
mendations of its research arm, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH)).
284. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 379.
285. Id. at 378-79.
286. Morriss & Dudley, supra note 187, at 48-50.
287. See id. at 9.
288. In 1929, a total of 500 out of 2000 workers tunneling through a vein of nearly
pure quartz in Gauley Bridge, West Virginia died from acute silicosis. Id. at 30.
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ter the Reagan Administration took office in 1981. President
Reagan created a Task Force for Regulatory Relief, chaired by
then-Vice President George H.W. Bush, which invited business
executives to nominate regulations that they thought should be
repealed. 2 9 The lead phasedown program was near the top of the
industry "hit list." The Task Force directed EPA to relax or abol-
ish the lead standard.290
In response to this directive, EPA in February 1982 proposed
relaxing or rescinding the lead standard for large refiners and sus-
pending indefinitely the October 1, 1982 date for small refiners to
comply with the 0.5gpg standard.291 EPA based this proposal en-
tirely on a desire to reduce the costs incurred by petroleum refin-
eries. In developing the proposal EPA gave no consideration to
the health effects of increased lead usage other than to state that
eventually the use of leaded gasoline would cease after cars with-
out catalytic converters disappeared from the highways. 292 Al-
though President Reagan had decreed that all significant new
regulatory proposals had to be subjected to rigorous cost-benefit
analysis, 293 his administration did not interpret this decree to ap-
ply to proposals to relax regulations because they would save in-
dustry money. Thus, no attempt was made to determine whether
relaxation of the lead standard would result in net benefits to
society.294
The Reagan Administration's effort to relax the lead standard
ultimately was unsuccessful, in part due to data that became
available while EPA's rulemaking was underway. The scientific
equivalent of a "smoking gun" linking leaded gasoline with lead
poisoning was contained in the results of the second National
Health and Nutrition Examination Study (NHANES II).295 This
study was conducted between 1976 and 1980, a period during
which a substantial reduction occurred in the use of leaded gaso-
line as the result of turnover of the vehicle fleet to new cars using
unleaded gasoline. The study showed that as gasoline lead use
289. Robert V. Percival, supra note 62, at 148.
290. Id. at 187-88.
291. Regulation of Fuel and Fuel Additives, 47 Fed. Reg. 7812 (proposed Feb. 22,
1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
292. See id. at 7813.
293. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
294. Robert V. Percival, supra note 62, at 187-88.
295. See generally J.L. ANNEST & K. MAHAFFEY, NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH
STATISTICS, SERIES 111 No. 233, BLOOD LEAD LEVELS FOR PERSONS AGES 6 MONTHS -
74 YEARS: UNITED STATES, 1976-80 (1984).
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declined between 1976 and 1980, mean blood levels declined in
closely parallel fashion from 14.6 to 9.2 pg/dl. 296
During the period from 1976 to 1980, use of lead additives in
gasoline declined. 297 Over these same four years, median blood
lead levels in the U.S. population aged six months to seventy
years also declined by about 37 percent. 298 This decrease was ob-
served in all ages sampled.299 Thus it could not be related to
sources such as paint, which present particular problems of expo-
sure to young children. Of greater epidemiological significance,
there was a similar decrease in the prevalence of children with
blood-lead levels in excess of 30 pg/dl (formerly the definition of
clinical lead toxicity).300
The NHANES II study represented the most significant dem-
onstration of the link between lead additives in gasoline and
human lead exposure. Because the study covered thousands of
persons and gathered meticulous demographic information on
them, it was possible to examine other variables to assess their
contribution to the downward trend in levels of lead in human
blood. The NHANES II data showed the extraordinary strength
of the link between lead usage in gasoline and blood-lead levels,
which persisted after controlling for age, sex, race, geographic re-
gions, income levels, and other factors.30 1 Other studies demon-
strated that even as leaded gasoline usage fluctuated seasonally,
blood-lead levels fluctuated in parallel fashion.30 2
In the face of overwhelming evidence that relaxation of the
lead standard would dramatically increase the incidence of lead
poisoning among children, the EPA abandoned its efforts to abol-
ish the lead standard. 30 3 In October 1982, the agency adopted
296. See id. at 13.
297. Small Refiner Lead Phase-down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 527 (D.C.
Cir. 1983).
298. ANNEST & MAHAFFEY, supra note 295, at 13.
299. See id. at 3.
300. See id. at 7, 8 tbl.A.
301. See generally id.
302. Small Refiner Lead Phase-down, 705 F.2d at 528.
303. An unexpected, and influential, opponent of relaxing the lead standard was
columnist George Will, who had befriended President Reagan. He wrote a powerful
column praising the administration's proposal to strengthen limits on levels of lead in
gasoline. George F. Will, The Poison Poor Children Breathe, WASH. POST, Sept. 16,
1982, at A23. Despite the NHANES data, Will stood virtually alone among the con-
servative establishment in opposing administration efforts to relax the lead standard.
When EPA abandoned the proposal, the editors of the Wall Street Journal attacked
the agency for giving into scare tactics by environmentalists. Editorial, Lead Balloon,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1982, at A16. Louis Rukeyser, host of the popular television
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new regulations that actually strengthened the existing standard
by modifying it to restrict the total number of grams of lead that
could be used per leaded gallon of gasoline produced, and by ap-
plying the same lead limits to all refiners, large and small. 30 4
In a subsequent court challenge to the new standard brought
by small refiners, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit was so impressed by the strength of the scientific
evidence linking leaded gasoline with levels of lead in children's
blood that it questioned why EPA had not decided to ban lead ad-
ditives entirely.30 5 The court concluded that,
In sum, the demonstrated connection between gasoline lead and
blood lead, the demonstrated health effects of blood lead levels
of 30 pg/dl or above, and the significant risk of adverse health
effects from blood lead levels as low as 10-15 p g/dl would justify
EPA in banning lead from gasoline entirely.30 6
Although scientific evidence was mounting that lead emis-
sions posed an even greater danger to public health than previ-
ously believed, the EPA did not consider strengthening the lead
standard again until it was confronted by an entirely separate
problem. Emissions of conventional pollutants (e.g., hydrocar-
bons, nitrogen oxides, and carbon monoxide) from motor vehicles
were increasing because many new cars that were supposed to use
only unleaded gasoline were mis-fueled with leaded gasoline be-
cause it was slightly cheaper.30 7 The use of leaded gasoline in new
vehicles equipped with catalytic converters had rendered many of
these emissions-control devices ineffective. 308 Environmentalists
urged EPA to solve the mis-fueling problem by phasing out the
use of gasoline lead additives. 30 9 Curiously, the decision to con-
sider slashing the lead content of gasoline was initiated almost by
accident. Prior to his death, former EPA Deputy Administrator Al
Alm wrote that this action, which he believed to be the most sig-
nificant EPA initiative during his five and one-half years at the
agency, came about in the following manner:
program "Wall Street Week," called limits on lead in gasoline "economically damaging
restrictions" that produced no "health gains." Louis Rukeyser, The Lead War: Reagan
Caves in on Deregulation, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 5, 1982, at G6.
304. Small Refiner Lead Phase-down, 705 F.2d at 513.
305. See id. at 530-31.
306. Id. at 531.
307. See Robert V. Percival, supra note 62, at 188.
308. See id.
309. See id.
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[T]he overwhelming environmental agenda facing EPA did not
include further removal of lead from gasoline as a serious prior-
ity. Then by chance, in a meeting in my office, someone asked
me, 'Why are you allowing any lead in gasoline? There don't
appear to be any benefits from it, and there are any number of
health risks.' On the basis of this statement, I commissioned a
group of people in EPA's policy office to look into the problem.
They came up with an absolutely superb document concluding
that the risks of continuing to use lead in gasoline were high,
and that the benefits of its continued use were negative. The
argument for eliminating lead in gasoline clearly emerged as
compelling, and it would have been irresponsible to pursue any
other course. 310
EPA staff then prepared a study of the costs and benefits of
strengthening the lead standard as a means not only of protecting
health, but also of reducing mis-fueling.
In March 1984, EPA released the results of this cost-benefit
analysis, which showed that a 90-percent reduction in the lead
content of gasoline would generate net benefits of several billion
dollars. 311 While the cost of making gasoline would increase by
less than 1 percent, EPA estimated that such a reduction in lead
usage would reduce the number of children with blood-lead levels
above 30 pg/dl by more than 50,000 in 1986; further, it would sub-
stantially reduce emissions of conventional pollutants by reducing
mis-fueling while saving nearly a billion dollars annually in vehi-
cle maintenance expenses. 31 2
In August 1984, the EPA proposed to reduce the lead content
of leaded gasoline by more than 90 percent (to 0.10 gpg), effective
January 1, 1986.313 EPA adopted this proposal in March 1985,
along with an interim phasedown to 0.50 gpg, which became effec-
tive on July 1, 1985.314 During the EPA rulemaking, new studies
linking elevated lead levels in adult males with high blood pres-
sure provided further evidence that the deleterious health effects
310. Al Alm, The Multimedia Approach to Pollution Control: An Impossible
Dream?, in MULTIMEDIA APPROACHES TO POLLUTION CONTROL: A SYMPosIUM PROCEED-
INGS 114, 115 (1987).
311. See JOEL SCHWARTZ ET AL., COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REDUCING LEAD IN GASO-
LINE summary tbl.1 (1984).
312. See id. at 1.7, 111.2, IV.A, V.3.
313. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Lead Phase Down, 49 Fed. Reg.
31,032, 31,032 (proposed Aug. 2, 1984).
314. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Gasoline Lead Content, 50 Fed. Reg.
9386, 9386 (Mar. 7, 1985).
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of lead emissions are not confined to young children.315 Although
EPA did not rely on the blood-pressure studies in making its deci-
sion to strengthen the lead standard, the studies did provide fur-
ther impetus for banning lead from gasoline entirely. 316 In the
1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, Congress banned the sale
of leaded gasoline after December 31, 1995.317
I. EPA's Asbestos Phaseout Rule and the Corrosion Proof
Fittings Decision
Enacted in 1976, the TSCA was designed to provide EPA with
an integrative approach to regulating substances whose uses,
from cradle to grave, posed significant risks to human health and
the environment. 318 After the legislation was signed into law by
President Ford in October 1976, then-EPA Administrator Russell
Train hailed it as "one of the most important pieces of 'preventive
medicine' legislation ever passed by Congress."319 However,
TSCA has largely failed to achieve its promise of comprehensive,
preventive regulation on a multi-media basis.
This is well illustrated by the Fifth Circuit's decision in Corro-
sion Proof Fittings v. EPA,320 which invalidated one of EPA's most
significant initiatives during the administrations of Presidents
Reagan and George H.W. Bush: EPA's effort to phase out remain-
ing uses of asbestos. EPA understood well the human health risks
of asbestos, which had led it to ban some of the most dangerous
uses of asbestos, including friable insulation products.321 After an
315. See James L. Pirkle et al., The Relationship Between Blood Lead Levels and
Blood Pressure and Its Cardiovascular Risk Implications, 121 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY,
No. 2, at 246 (1985).
316. See Albert L. Nichols, Lead in Gasoline, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: As-
SESSING REGULATORY IMPACT 49, 71-75 (Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997).
317. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 220, 104 Stat.
2399, 2500 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(n)). David Schoenbrod, a critic of congres-
sional delegation of authority to agencies, argues that by authorizing EPA to deal
with the lead-in-gasoline problem, Congress prolonged the continuation of this mas-
sive health hazard. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASH-
INGTON: How CONGRESS GRABS POWER, SHIRKS RESPONSIBILITY, AND SHORTCHANGES
THE PEOPLE 35-38 (2005). However, he fails to acknowledge that the final, total ban
on tetraethyl additives was indeed mandated by Congress, albeit quite belatedly.
318. See Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692).
319. Press Release, EPA, Train Sees New Toxic Substances Law as "Preventive
Medicine" (Oct. 21, 1976), http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/tsca/03.htm (internal
quotation marks omitted).
320. 947 F.2d 1201, 1229-30 (5th Cir. 1991).
321. Proposed Amendments to Asbestos & Mercury Emission Standards, 39 Fed.
Reg. 38,064, 38,064 (Oct. 25, 1974).
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extensive investigation, which extended for more than a decade
and included the promulgation of a rule requiring companies us-
ing asbestos to report data to EPA, the agency proposed its
phaseout rule.322 The agency issued the final rule based on its
conclusion that only a staged-ban "will adequately control" the life
cycle of asbestos exposure risks that occur whenever the sub-
stance is mined, used in manufacturing, released into the environ-
ment through deteriorating asbestos-containing products, or is
disposed.323 A panel of Fifth Circuit judges struck down this regu-
lation, concluding that the agency had failed to perform suffi-
ciently detailed cost-benefit analyses of banning not only each
particular use of asbestos, but also of all intermediate alternatives
short of a ban.324
Three aspects of the Corrosion Proof Fittings decision are par-
ticularly relevant to consideration of the precautionary principle:
(1) the court's discussion of unquantified benefits, (2) its conclu-
sion that EPA failed to perform sufficient analysis of the risks of
substitutes for asbestos, and (3) its endorsement of EPA's decision
to ban future uses of asbestos.325 Section 6 of TSCA requires EPA
to balance costs and benefits in determining if "there is a reasona-
ble basis to conclude" that any chemical substance "presents or
will present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the envi-
ronment."326 The legislative history of TSCA indicates that Con-
gress did not intend to require EPA to base its judgment
concerning the reasonableness of risk on the results of detailed
cost-benefit analyses. The House committee report on the legisla-
tion states that the balancing required by section 6 does not re-
quire "factual certainty" because "factual certainty respecting the
existence of an unreasonable risk of a particular harm may not be
possible." 327 The Senate committee report emphasized that "it is
not feasible to reach a decision just on the basis of quantitative
comparisons" because "one is weighing noncommensurates," and
322. Asbestos Restrictions, 51 Fed. Reg. 3738, 3738 (proposed Jan. 29, 1986).
323. Asbestos: Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Com-
merce Prohibitions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,468 (July 12, 1989).
324. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1216-17.
325. See id. at 1216, 1218-21, 1229-30.
326. Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, § 6, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a), (c)).
327. H.R. REP. No. 94-1341, at 32 (1976).
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that EPA must give "full consideration" to the "burdens of human
suffering and premature death."328
Despite this legislative history, the Fifth Circuit interpreted
the statute not only to require detailed, product-by-product cost-
benefit analyses, but also to require detailed analyses of the costs
and benefits of every intermediate step short of a ban for control-
ling asbestos risks.3 29 It also rejected EPA's conclusion that its
"unreasonable risk determination" was justified because the bene-
fits it could not quantify (given the lack of data on actual ambient
air levels of asbestos attributable to particular asbestos products)
were an order of magnitude greater than the quantified bene-
fits. 330 Rather than employing conservative default assumptions
when data were lacking, EPA analysts working on the asbestos
phaseout rule instead assumed that where exposure data were
lacking there was no exposure to asbestos.3 31 This "led to easy
agreements between EPA and OMB regarding the costs and bene-
fits of the rule, and avoided charges that the agency might be
overstating risk or understating costs"; but it ultimately resulted
in a gross underestimation of the true risks posed by asbestos.332
The reviewing court then rejected the agency's efforts to justify
the phaseout rule on the basis of unquantified benefits. 333 The
court's decision erected an impossibly high analytical burden that
barred EPA from phasing out nearly all remaining uses of a sub-
stance that the agency believed posed an unreasonable risk to
human health. In doing so, the court applied a kind of reverse
precautionary principle. Its decision essentially declares that for
a substance known to cause serious and irreversible damage to
health, lack of certainty concerning the costs and benefits of all
regulatory alternatives shall be used as a reason for not regulat-
ing it.
328. S. REP. No. 94-698, at 13 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491,
4503.
329. See Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1216-17, 1223.
330. See id. at 1218-19 ("Unquantified benefits can, at times, permissibly tip the
balance in close cases. They cannot, however, be used to effect a wholesale shift on
the balance beam.").
331. See Christine M. Augustyniak, Asbestos, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: As-
SESSING REGULATORY IMPACT, supra note 316, at 171, 191-92.
332. Id. at 198.
333. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1218-19. The court also rejected EPA's
belated effort to rely on analogous 'exposure data (instead of assuming that the ab-
sence of exposure data meant the absence of risk), because the agency had not sub-
jected the analogous exposure methodology to notice and comment procedures. See
id. at 1212.
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Critics of the precautionary principle argue that it is poten-
tially paralyzing because any regulatory action may create risks of
its own that could leave society worse off than before.334 They fre-
quently cite Corrosion Proof Fittings in support of this proposition
because the court chastised EPA for failing to perform detailed
analyses of the risks of substitutes for asbestos.335 But the issue
of the risks of substitutes arose during the asbestos rulemaking
only because producers of asbestos, who maintained that their
products did not pose significant risks, disingenuously argued
that other products that might appear as substitutes for them
would. 336 This was classic strategic behavior by the purveyors of
one of the most thoroughly studied toxic substances (the legisla-
tive history of TSCA indicates that asbestos was one of the sub-
stances Congress considered to be a prime candidate for a
phaseout), 337 and it was designed simply to erect yet another im-
possible analytic burden on an agency seeking to regulate a
known risk. By requiring EPA to conduct an analysis of the toxic-
ity of substitutes whenever a regulatory target "brings forth credi-
ble evidence" suggesting its toxicity, the Fifth Circuit applied a
reverse precautionary principle that could prevent known unrea-
sonable risks from being phased out if there is uncertainty con-
cerning the risks of what may replace them.
Despite the decision's obvious faults, lurking in one aspect of
Corrosion Proof Fittings is a surprisingly powerful endorsement of
the precautionary principle. Almost unnoticed in the wake of the
court's invalidation of the asbestos phaseout is the court's surpris-
ing holding affirming EPA's decision to ban all past asbestos prod-
ucts that no longer were being produced in the United States, as
well as all unknown, future uses of asbestos. 338 The court noted
that although products no longer being sold in the United States
currently pose zero risk, "[t]his would soon change if the product
returned, which is precisely what the EPA is trying to avoid."339
For future products, the court conceded that "EPA cannot possibly
evaluate the costs and benefits of banning unknown, uninvented
334. See sources cited supra notes 43, 45-46.
335. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 35, at 32.
336. The author represented Environmental Defense Fund during these and sub-
sequent rulemakings. His description of the arguments that the lead and asbestos
industry made is based upon his personal knowledge.
337. See, e.g., 94 CONG. SENATE DEBATES 8281-8300 (1976).
338. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1229.
339. Id.
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products." 340 However, it held "that the nebulousness of these fu-
ture products, combined with TSCA's language authorizing the
EPA to ban products that 'will' create a public risk, allows the
EPA to ban future uses of asbestos even in products not yet on the
market."' 341 For these products, the court requires neither cost-
benefit analysis, nor analysis of the risks of possible substitutes.
It recognizes that because the uncertainties surrounding future
products make it impossible to perform such analyses, EPA's pre-
cautionary approach is proper to avoid the appearance (or re-ap-
pearance) of potentially deadly products.
While the Fifth Circuit's decision effectively precludes EPA
from banning existing uses of asbestos, many other countries have
done so, and even the World Trade Organization (WTO) has ruled
in favor of such bans. As of January 2005, thirty-eight countries,
including most EU member states, have banned asbestos. 342 In
September 2000, a WTO dispute-resolution panel upheld France's
ban on imports of chrysotile asbestos, rejecting arguments by Ca-
nada that it was an unjustified restriction on trade, an argument
representatives of the Canadian asbestos industry had made dur-
ing the EPA rulemaking. 343 The panel concluded that the risks of
asbestos had been so thoroughly researched that the ban, which
normally would violate WTO rules promoting free trade, was jus-
tified as necessary to protect human health.344
IV. CONCLUSION: REGULATORY POLICY & THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
The foregoing, rather extensive review of aspects of the his-
tory of U.S. regulatory policy offers some useful lessons concern-
ing how society has responded to environmental risk and the
value of a precautionary approach to regulation.
A. Lessons from the History of Lead Poisoning
The history of lead poisoning demonstrates that regulatory
policy sometimes errs, and errs badly, by underestimating or over-
340. Id. at 1219.
341. Id.
342. Canadian Association of University Teachers, Current Asbestos Bans and Re-
strictions (Jan. 4, 2005), http://www.caut.ca/en/issues/asbestos/current-bans.pdf.
343. Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and As-
bestos-Containing Products, IT 8.231-8.241, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000).
344. Id. 8.169-8.223.
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looking truly significant risks.345 While availability of scientific
knowledge has a critical impact on regulatory priority-setting,
public awareness of risk seems to be an even more important in-
fluence in focusing regulatory attention on suspected problems.
Despite widespread awareness of the risks of exposure to lead,
regulatory attention is far less likely to be devoted to similar
chronic low-level environmental hazards than to acute highly visi-
ble incidents that command public attention.346
The deaths of workers producing TEL in the 1920s only
briefly focused the attention of public health and regulatory au-
thorities on the potential long-term health effects of lead in gaso-
line. Public alarm gave regulatory authorities an opportunity to
consider whether to permit a new technology that ultimately
would disperse massive quantities of a known toxic substance into
the environment, causing enormous damage to public health. An
appropriate precautionary step was taken when leaded gasoline
temporarily was removed from the market pending the results of
further research. Unfortunately, the study designed to assess the
risks of leaded gasoline focused only on short-term exposures.
Children, who we now know are the most susceptible to damage
from lead emissions, were not included in the study, even though
there already was some knowledge about what groups were likely
to be most susceptible to damage from lead emissions. 347
Perhaps the crucial shortcoming of regulatory policy was its
failure to follow up on the initial studies of the health effects of
TEL, despite the recommendations from the blue-ribbon panel
that further long-term research was needed. As a result, for more
than four decades virtually no research, independent of that per-
345. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 36, stating that,
Americans have experienced the pain and suffering that can result from
insufficient precaution in risk management. The health risks of smoking,
the neurotoxic effects of low doses of lead, once used as an additive to
gasoline, and the respiratory diseases from exposure to asbestos in the
workplace: each became major public health problems in the USA. Public
health historians teach us that these problems could have been reduced
or even prevented altogether if early signals of danger had stimulated
precautionary measures by risk managers.
Id. See also Harremoes et al., supra note 8.
346. This also appears to apply to the enactment of environmental legislation. For
example, CERCLA was enacted in response to Love Canal and other incidents involv-
ing widespread public concern over uncontrolled hazardous waste sites; the origins of
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act can be traced to the
Bhopal tragedy. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 224, 483.
347. See GERALD MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, DECEIT AND DENIAL: THE DEADLY
POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION 33-35 (2002).
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formed by the lead industry, focused on the health effects of lead
emissions from gasoline. In part, this may have been the product
of an unwarranted perception that the question had been settled
once and for all, at least for purposes of regulatory decision-mak-
ing. Such myopia unfortunately is too frequently a feature of the
regulatory process. A preliminary decision that a substance does
not warrant regulatory attention may have an important influ-
ence on the future direction of scientific research.
While it is now known that public health would be far better
off if regulators had never permitted the use of leaded gasoline, it
was almost by coincidence that regulatory attention eventually fo-
cused on the health effects of lead additives. The initial EPA re-
strictions on the use of leaded gasoline were a response to the
need to protect catalytic converters, rather than humans, from the
effects of lead.348 Similarly, the eventual decision to drastically
reduce lead levels in gasoline was set in motion as much by frus-
tration with the mis-fueling problem as by concern over the health
effects of lead emissions. Yet once policymakers eventually fo-
cused on the appropriate questions, a compelling case was made
for regulatory action.
While the elimination of lead additives from gasoline has
been a major success story for environmental regulation, it is only
one important element of the total problem of human lead expo-
sure, which also includes a massive residue of lead paint in the
urban housing stock and lead in plumbing and piping fixtures that
carry drinking water. In 1980, a report by the National Academy
of Sciences stressed the need for a coordinated approach to control
all sources of human exposure to lead.349 The report noted that
"six federal agencies, acting under authority of at least eight sepa-
rate laws, have developed regulations or administer programs in-
tended to protect the public health from lead hazards."350
Although TSCA was designed to provide EPA with such compre-
hensive regulatory authority, the Corrosion Proof Fittings decision
effectively crippled the agency's ability to conduct multi-source,
multi-media regulation by imposing seemingly impossible analyti-
cal preconditions on regulation.
348. See Warren T. Piver, Potential Dilemma: The Methods of Meeting Automotive
Exhaust Emission Standards of the Clean Air Act of 1970, 8 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPEC-
TIVES 165, 165, 166, 178 (1974).
349. LEAD IN THE HuMAN ENVIRONMENT, supra note 81.
350. Id. at 4.
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B. The Elusive Search for a Regulatory Decision Rule
Proponents of cost-benefit analysis as a regulatory decision
rule are highly critical of the precautionary principle. Yet when
they are asked to respond to potentially catastrophic risks that
are so uncertain that one cannot with a straight face assign nu-
merical values to the costs and benefits of controlling them, they
end up suggesting something like a precautionary approach. 351
This is essentially what the Corrosion Proof Fittings court did in
upholding EPA's ban on future uses for asbestos, and this is what
society generally does in opting to protect endangered species.
While a cost-benefit analysis ultimately helped grease the
wheels for EPA's decision to virtually eliminate lead additives
from gasoline,352 it ultimately was the undoing of the agency's ini-
tiative to phaseout most remaining uses of asbestos. The differ-
ence is not because the latter was a poor decision, but rather that
it was more vulnerable to challenge because the agency deliber-
ately had not employed its usual precautionary approach in esti-
mating all of the benefits it anticipated from the rule.3 5 3 That,
combined with a reviewing court's imposition of impossibly de-
tailed analytic requirements not contemplated by Congress when
it enacted TSCA, led to invalidation of the rule and paralysis in
using TSCA as a vehicle for addressing multi-media risks in a
comprehensive fashion.
The Ethyl decision leaves little doubt that had EPA been re-
quired to base its initial decision to limit the amount of lead addi-
tives in gasoline on the results of a cost-benefit analysis, it would
have been impossible to promulgate this crucial regulation. 354
The agency's initial rule was upheld by a five-four vote of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, in a decision
expressly endorsing the precautionary principle.3 55 Had this deci-
sion gone the other way, the lead limits would have been invali-
dated and the initial reductions in levels of lead in children's blood
would not have occurred. Thus, a precautionary approach was
crucial to the initial development of a regulation that was later
351. See Lisa Heinzerling, The Accidental Environmentalist: Judge Posner on Cat-
astrophic Thinking 18-25 (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Working Paper No. 770326,
2005) (reviewing RIcHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2004)),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=770326; StINSTEIN, supra note 35, at 109-128.
352. Nichols, supra note 316, at 49.
353. See Augustyniak, supra note 331, at 198-99.
354. See Frank Ackerman et al., Applying Cost-Benefit to Past Decisions: Was En-
vironmental Protection Ever a Good Idea?, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 155, 159-61 (2005).
355. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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broadened to produce one of the most dramatic success stories for
environmental regulation.
C. Fear Not the Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle does not answer the question of
how precautionary regulatory policy should be, but it can serve as
an important reminder that regulatory policy should seek to pre-
vent harm before it occurs, and that it should reject the insistence
of regulatory targets that a never-ending quest for improved infor-
mation should indefinitely postpone sensible regulatory measures.
Despite the popularity of the precautionary principle, in practice
U.S. regulatory policy generally has been reactive, rather than
precautionary. Yet it has the capability of responding in a precau-
tionary manner when a serious threat of potential harm, such as
destruction of the Earth's protective ozone layer, captures public
imagination and stimulates regulatory action.
The German concept of Vorsorge, from which the precaution-
ary principle has evolved, emphasizes the importance of early de-
tection of dangers to health and the environment through
comprehensive research. The absence of pre-market testing re-
quirements for new chemicals in the United States, and the lack of
toxicity information for a large percentage of chemicals currently
on the market, 35 6 may help explain the generally reactive nature
of U.S. regulatory policy. This is why the environmental and pub-
lic health communities have been pressing to require testing of
high production volume chemicals and to close serious data gaps
in EPA's Integrated Risk Information System.357
Critics of the precautionary principle have focused largely on
a caricature of it that does not reflect the realities of global efforts
to refine procedures for detecting and responding to environmen-
tal risks.358 They argue that regulation creates its own hazards
without making a persuasive case that control of known risks will
lead to substitute hazards that are systematically likely to be
worse, and less amenable to control, than those that have trig-
gered precautionary regulation. A strong case can be made that
356. See generally EPA's Office of Pollution Prevention & Toxics, Analysis of Test
Data Availability for HPV Chemicals, 22 CHEM. REG. REP. 261 (1998).
357. See, e.g., Rena I. Steinzor et al., Overcoming 'Environmental Data Gaps': Why
What EPA Doesn't Know About Toxic Chemicals Can Hurt (Ctr. Progessive Reform,
White Paper #510, 2005).
358. See Applegate, supra note 44, which traces the "taming" of the precautionary
principle as efforts have been made to integrate it into a risk assessment framework.
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the consequences for society of false negatives (erroneously deem-
ing a hazardous chemical to pose no hazard) generally are far
worse than the consequences of false positives (erroneously deem-
ing a safe chemical to be hazardous),359 as illustrated by the his-
tory of regulation of lead and asbestos. Moreover, those who insist
that the precautionary principle is undermined by potential secon-
dary and tertiary risks spawned by regulatory action ignore the
often-substantial secondary and tertiary benefits of regulation. 360
Regulatory targets invariably seek to deflect attention from
the risks their activities generate by pointing the finger else-
where, as well illustrated by the regulatory history of both lead
and asbestos.361 As former EPA Administrator Christine Todd
Whitman observed in her remarkably candid memoirs:
Numerous businesses and trade associations, often represented
by powerful Republicans, spend millions of dollars each year
lobbying against virtually any new environmental regulation,
invariably claiming it will hamstring their ability to stay in bus-
iness, even though a great many American companies have fig-
ured out that good environmental practices are also good
business practices. Many others, however, almost reflexively
oppose any mandate to improve their environmental perform-
ance, no matter how much it needs improving. I sometimes
wonder whether those companies spend more money trying to
defeat new regulations than they would by simply complying
with them.362
Fears that the precautionary approach inexorably will lead to
massive overregulation greatly underestimate the ability of regu-
latory targets to fend off regulation. 363 This is reflected in the fact
359. For a discussion of these approaches, see Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic
Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 230-37 (1978).
360. See generally Rascoff & Revesz, supra note 49.
361. The Ethyl Corporation resisted regulation of tetraethyl lead by arguing that
lead paint was the primary cause of childhood lead poisoning. During EPA's asbestos
phaseout rulemaking, the asbestos industry told EPA that OSHA's ongoing rulemak-
ing to tighten the standard for occupational exposure to asbestos made EPA's propo-
sal unnecessary, while simultaneously arguing before OSHA that its proposed rule
was infeasible. Again, this information is based on the author's personal knowledge.
See supra note 336.
362. CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN, IT'S My PARTY Too: THE BATTLE FOR THE HEART OF
THE GOP AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA 163-64 (2005).
363. See generally THOMAS 0. McGARITY ET AL., SOPHISTICATED SABOTAGE: THE IN-
TELLECTUAL GAMES USED TO SUBVERT RESPONSIBLE REGULATION 17-18 (2004); Lisa
Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, The Humbugs of the Anti-Regulatory Movement, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 648, 670 (2002).
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that the vast majority of the regulatory initiatives that have be-
come the focus of critics of environmental regulation because they
were projected to be overly costly were never actually imple-
mented, as Lisa Heinzerling has demonstrated. 364
Critics of the precautionary principle have picked on a straw
man by arguing that it will produce overregulation when in fact, it
does not specify how precautionary regulatory policy should be.
Each sovereign country must decide for itself how precautionary
regulatory policy should be, and such decisions ideally should be
the product of democratic processes. Countries legitimately may
opt to establish levels of environmental protection that are higher
than those required by existing international standards. What
the precautionary principle does is sensibly remind us of the rea-
sons why environmental policy has shifted away from the common
law's approach, which required individualized proof of causal in-
jury before environmental harm could be redressed. While it is
undoubtedly possible to be overly precautionary and to take ac-
tions in the name of precaution that end up backfiring, the history
of regulatory policy suggests that adherence to the precautionary
principle is more likely to contribute to avoiding a repetition of
tragedies like those caused by tetraethyl lead and asbestos than it
is to cause them. Fear not the precautionary principle.
364. Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981,
1984 (1998).
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